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The 2007-2008 ﬁnancial crises has made it painfully obvious that markets may quickly turn illiquid.
Moreover, recent experience has taught us that distress and lack of active trading can jump “around”
between seemingly unconnected parts of the ﬁnancial system contributing to transforming isolated shocks
into systemic panic attacks. We develop a simple two-period model populated by both standard expected
utility maximizers and by ambiguity-averse investors that trade in the market for a risky asset. We show
that, provided there is a suﬃcient amount of ambiguity, market break-downs where large portions of traders
withdraw from trading are endogeneous and may be triggered by modest re-assessments of the range of
possible scenarios on the performance of individual securities. Risk premia (spreads) increase with the
proportion of traders in the market who are averse to ambiguity. When we analyze the eﬀect of policy
actions, we ﬁnd that when a market has fallen into a state of impaired liquidity, bringing the market back to
orderly functioning through a reduction in the amount of perceived ambiguity may cause further reductions
in equilibrium prices. Finally, our model provides stark indications against the idea that policy-makers may
be able to “inﬂate” their way out of a ﬁnancial crisis.
JEL codes: G10, G18, D81, E60.
Keywords: ambiguity, ambiguity-aversion, participation, liquidity, asset pricing.
”The trading of legacy loans and securities continues to reveal systematic underpricing at
issuance of once seemingly benign risks—credit, liquidity, counterparty, and even sovereign risks
[...] Until these assessments are more clearly reﬁned and more broadly understood, we are likely to
observe elevated levels of volatility and unwillingness by many investors to participate in certain
asset markets at virtually any price.” (K. Warsh, 2009, emphasis added)
1. Introduction
The major, painful surprise of the on-going ﬁnancial crisis is that established, high-volume ﬁnancial markets
may simply turn illiquid in the blink of an eye. In a matter of weeks–often days–traders, transactions,
∗Correspondence to: Research Division, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166, United States. E-mail: Mas-
simo.Guidolin@stls.frb.org; phone: 314-444-8550.price discovery functions–in short liquidity–have vaporized. World ﬁnancial markets, ﬁrms, households and
policy-makers alike have been left hanging with trillions of ﬁnancial assets at face value, whose market price
is simply unknown, or often well-approximated by a bleak zero. As it is well known to practitioners, market
break-down problems have a way to quickly become solvency problems. Perhaps institution A cannot manage
a payment (say, on a derivative contract) only because it does not have the needed cash at hand. However,
this can be interpreted by its creditor–institution B–as meaning that A is carrying liabilities that exceed
the value of its assets. Worse, institution C, which has traditionally stood ready to lend over the short-term
to A, may become aware of the situation and start refusing to lend to A, require dazzlingly high spreads over
normal market rates, or worse, require high percentages of collateral to be pledged in the form of high-quality,
liquid securities that A no longer holds in its balance sheet. At this point, a perverse spiral of cash shortage,
inability to access unsecured short-term funding, and over-investment in hard-to-evaluate illiquid assets may
drive a once powerful ﬁnancial conglomerate (A) to insolvency.
Of course, even looking beyond the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the history of ﬁnancial markets is replete with
episodes of increase in uncertainty leading to a thinning out (or even to complete seizures) of trading intensity
especially in assets such as high yield corporate bonds and bonds issued in emerging markets. For instance,
it is well known that in 1998 there was a paralysis aﬄicting the junk bond markets in the U.S. and in Europe
in the aftermath of the Russian and East Asian crises, when market uncertainty was exacerbated by the U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank’s unprecedented role in facilitating a recapitalization of the hedge fund Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM).1
Another painful realization of the 2007-2008 crisis is that the extent to which liquidity problems can
jump “around” between seemingly unconnected and strong parts of the global ﬁnancial system can take on
a dramatic pace, often impossible to control by regulators and policy authorities and diﬃcult to hedge in
the perspective of market participants. While now the causes of the crisis have become clear and appear
to be rooted in the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and in a host of poor business and risk
management practices, it remains unclear how the losses, originally localized in the market for asset-backed
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), could spread to other parts of the system (see, e.g., Dodd, 2007,
and Kodres, 2008). Like an epidemic in which an invisible virus infects many unrelated people, the ﬁnancial
crisis spread when losses to intermediaries in one scarcely (usually over-the-counter) transparent market
raised concerns about liquidity and solvency elsewhere, even in regulated and highly transparent markets.
The absence of clear (traceable and manageable) linkages among the markets progressively sucked in by the
mounting crisis suggests that economic analysis should focus on models in which market break-downs may
occur endogenously and involve multiple markets at the same time, irrespective of their micro-structure.
In this paper, we focus on one potential cause of market breakdowns: the presence of diﬃcult-to-quantify
uncertainty, ambiguity (as opposed to quantiﬁable risk), and market traders’ aversion to ambiguity. For our
1During the 1998 Russian crisis, bid-ask spreads on emerging market debt increased from 10-20 basis points to 60-80 basis
points (International Monetary Fund (1998)). Bank of International Settlements (1999) describes how a number of market-makers
simply withdrew from trading following the 1998 Russian default and stopped posting quotes.
2purposes, we deﬁne a market breakdown (sometimes we shall also use the expression collapse) as a situation of
receding trading–possibly caused by the decision of some fraction of the potential traders not to participate
in the market–accompanied by strong and persistent price declines and high premia (spreads) over equivalent
but uncertainty-free securities. We propose a stylized model of portfolio choice and market equilibrium with
two categories of traders, standard expected utility maximizers and ambiguity-averse agents, and show that
prices, expected returns, and the decision to participate may have interesting non-linear properties such that–
provided there is enough ambiguity and that this ambiguity is stronger for idiosyncratic than for systematic
uncertainty–market breakdowns may endogenously occur. We use the model to characterize potential policy
reactions, both formally and informally, by assessing the pros and cons of changes in the parameters of the
model that have an interpretation as a result of policy actions.
Why ambiguity? For at least two reasons that it may be helpful to brieﬂy explain to sort out the contribu-
tion of our paper. First, because the applications of models of decision-making under ambiguity have recently
witnessed such a powerful acceleration that to collect a few thoughts on one simple (probably, the simplest)
model connecting the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial turmoil with this literature seems to be a useful eﬀort, especially
for its possible policy implications (see Mukerjie and Tallon, 2003, for reviews of applications of ambiguity in
applied economics). Traditional ﬁnance theory assumes that agents are either expected or subjective expected
(SEU) utility maximizers. According to Expected Utility Theory (EU), decision makers choose among dif-
ferent risky prospects by comparing their expected utilities. That is, they confront the weighted sums of the
outcomes’ utility values, using as weights the associated probabilities. Savage (1954) elaborated an alterna-
tive theory (Subjective Expected Utility Theory) for deﬁning probabilities in absence of statistics by simply
observing individuals’ choices. After having derived the probability distribution, SEU theory prescribes to
proceed as under EU. The main diﬃculty with this approach is that its applications to asset markets assume
the distributions of asset payoﬀs are known to investors. This assumption is usually justiﬁed with the rational
expectations hypothesis. For some assets and some investors this is a reasonable assumption; for others it is
surely not reasonable. Do unsophisticated investors know the distribution of payoﬀs to even simple portfolios?
Do major ﬁnancial institutions know the distribution of future payoﬀs to all sort of asset- and mortgage-backed
securities and to complicated CDOs?2
Our second motivation lies in the fact that only a model that captures the presence of ambiguity-aversion
makes a credible prediction that simple, idiosyncratic shocks that–in principle at least, according to SEU
classical ﬁnance theory, ought to be fully and cheaply diversiﬁable–may cause systemic panic attacks across a
range of diﬀerently structured and regulated ﬁnancial markets. In a security market model that accommodates
2Besides simple introspection on the plausibility of EU and SEU as realistic frameworks for decision-making, we have to recall
that experimental research has been rather unkind to the SEU and EU frameworks. In 1953, Allais (1953) designed a choice
problem to show an inconsistency of observed behaviors with the predictions of EU, even when probabilities are known in advance.
In essence, experimental subjects tend to violate the EU paradigm because they under-weight prospects with high potential payoﬀ
that comes with very low probability. Moreover, the experimental evidence shows that people dislike situations where they are
uncertain about the probability distribution of a gamble, that is, they are ambiguity-averse. In particular, Ellsberg (1961) ﬁrst
reported that for unknown probabilities, people behave in ways that cannot be reconciled with any assignment of subjective
probabilities. Section 3 discusses Ellsberg’s evidence in detail.
3a distinction between risk and ambiguity, investors are assumed to possess a subjective knowledge about the
likelihood of contingent events that is consistent with more than one probability distribution. Additionally,
whatever the investor knows about the future fails to inform her of a precise probability distribution over the set
of possible probabilities. In this case, we say that investors’ beliefs about contingent events are characterized
by ambiguity. If ambiguous, the agent’s beliefs are captured not by a unique probability distribution in the
standard Bayesian fashion but instead by a set of probabilities. Thus not only is the outcome of an act
uncertain but also the expected payoﬀ of the action, since the payoﬀ may be measured with respect to more
than one probability. Because this attitude applies in the same way independently of market rules or other
features of the micro-structure of each market, models that describe portfolio decisions and price assets under
ambiguity hold a promise to generate realistic contagious ﬁnancial crisis.
In our model the ambiguity-averse decision maker evaluates an act by the minimum expected value that
may be associated with it: the decision rule is to compute all possible expected values for each action and then
choose the act which has the best minimum expected outcome. This notion of ambiguity-aversion inspires
the formal model of Choquet expected utility (CEU) preferences introduced by Schmeidler (1989). Our main
ﬁndings are as follows. Provided there is a suﬃcient level of ambiguity, market breakdowns are endogenous
and may be triggered by otherwise modest re-assessments of the range of possible scenarios concerning the
perspectives of individual securities and/or ﬁrms. Additionally, the more ambiguity there is, the more likely
market disruptions become. In our model, market disruptions consist of equilibrium conﬁgurations in which
all ambiguity-averse investors withdraw and stop trading for all possible asset prices consistent with that set of
equilibria. Given a ﬁxed supply for the security, this translates in declining prices and high premia (spreads)
in excess of uncertainty-free assets.
We prove that uncertainty premia (spreads) increase with the proportion of traders in the market who
a r ea v e r s et oa m b i g u i t y . T h i sm a k e si n t u i t i v es e n s eb ecause when the market is well-functioning, there is a
higher fraction of investors that asks to be compensated not only for exposure to risk, but also for bearing
diﬃcult-to-quantify uncertainty. In case markets are already impaired and participation is limited to SEU
investors, the intuition is that the same supply of the security has to be absorbed by a shrinking fraction
of SEU investors, who will then require to be compensated by higher spreads. Interestingly, equilibrium
uncertainty premia decline with the exogenous inﬂation rate, which indicates that in our model risky assets
can only provide an imperfect hedge to inﬂation risks.
When we analyze the eﬀect of policy actions, we ﬁnd three interesting results. Reducing the amount of
ambiguity perceived by the market has diﬃcult-to-sign eﬀects on equilibrium prices. As long as the action
does not aﬀect the participating nature of the market, prices rise as ambiguity declines. However, assuming
the market had initially broken down (i.e., only SEU investor participated), by reducing enough the level
of ambiguity, a policy-maker may revive a well-functioning market in which all types of investors trade, but
this comes at the cost of lower prices and higher premia. This is relatively surprising: even though the
policy action consists of ruling out the worst possible scenarios to reduce perceived ambiguity, for an action
of suﬃcient magnitude its eventual eﬀect on equilibrium prices may be negative and the cost of enforcing a
4participation equilibrium consists of higher spreads. This means that when a market has fallen into a state of
low liquidity and trading disruption (an SEU-only equilibrium), bringing the market back to higher liquidity
and orderly functioning through a reduction in the amount of perceived ambiguity may actually cause further
reductions in equilibrium prices, which may pose a tough trade-oﬀ to policy makers. As trivial as this may
sound, the implication is that it is much cheaper for policy-makers to “manage” the presence of ambiguity in
well-functioning markets than in impaired ones, in the sense that in the latter case not only bigger eﬀorts are
likely to be required, but these may also confront policy oﬃcials with diﬃcult trade-oﬀs.
Finally, our model provides rather stark indications against the idea that policy-makers may wish to “in-
ﬂate” their way out of a ﬁnancial crisis. Even though our model treats inﬂation as an exogenous parameter,
its implications for the eﬀect of changes in the inﬂation rate are rich. A higher inﬂation rate in a segmented
market in which all ambiguity-averse investors have left already, simply strengthens the segmentation, while it
produces ambiguous eﬀects on risky asset prices (negative provided there is enough subjectively perceived total
uncertainty). A higher inﬂation rate in a non-segmented, well-functioning market produces again uncertain
eﬀects on risky asset prices and threatens to disrupt markets by forcing non-participation upon them. There-
fore, higher inﬂation as a policy tool seems either ineﬀective or perverse because it cannot relax participation
constraints while it may depress equilibrium prices.
Section 2 brieﬂy presents a number of stylized features of the recent ﬁnancial crisis setting the stage for the
empirical features our models are geared towards. Section 3 discusses the deﬁnition of ambiguity and reviews
a few papers that have examined the role of ambiguity-aversion in explaining market breakdowns. Section 4
oﬀers one simple but stark example of how ambiguity–speciﬁcally, ambiguity on the strength of idiosyncratic
risk–may cause a collapse in trading activity. Section 5 develops our heterogeneous agent model in which
assets are traded and priced by a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of SEU investors and a fraction 1 − α of ambiguity-
averse traders. After deriving results on equilibrium trading choices, prices, and risk premia, we discuss policy
implications from the model. Section 6 concludes.
2. Market Break-Downs and Risk Spreads in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis
In this Section we brieﬂy review the main events that have characterized the recent world-wide ﬁnancial crisis.
Our main purpose here is not to discuss causes or resolution strategies for the ﬁnancial turmoil (see, among
many others, the recent papers by Gorton, 2008, and Mizen, 2008), but to simply make a Reader aware of the
phenomena that have marked the outbreak of the crisis and that ought to be consistently explained by any
realistic model of ﬁnancial decision-making. In short, we want to focus on a small set of stylized facts that
will subsequently inform our treatment.
In the second half of 2007, the deteriorating performance of subprime mortgages in the U.S. triggered
a rapid re-assessment of credit and liquidity risks across a broad range of assets, leading to widespread
turbulence in international ﬁnancial markets. With the only exception of government-supported mortgages,
securitization markets (at ﬁrst those directly involving mortgage loans, and soon after all markets related to
5the origination of asset-backed securities) shut down. Quite naturally, because the crisis originated in the
mortgage market, when the strains ﬁrst hit in the Summer of 2007, the primary and secondary markets for
subprime mortgage-backed securities became illiquid at the very time highly leveraged investors such as hedge
funds needed to trade out of losing positions.3 The situation was exacerbated because, without trading, there
were no market prices to serve as benchmarks and no way to determine the value of the various risk tranches.
Dealers in over-the-counter (OTC) markets, facing a crunch on the funding side of their balance sheets and
holding an excessive amount of illiquid assets on the other, simply withdrew from the OTC markets they
had contributed to expand until the Spring of 2007. The jump in volatility made it especially dangerous and
expensive to continue in their market-making activity. Without dealers, trading broke down, especially in
diﬃcult-to-price securities such as CDOs, credit derivatives, and municipal bonds (characterized by frequent
rate reset auctions). By early 2008, many securities dealers and other institutions that had relied heavily on
short-term ﬁnancing through repurchase agreements and commercial paper were facing stringent borrowing
conditions. As an example of this generalized phenomenon of market shut-down, Figure 1, panel A, presents
weekly time series of origination values for newly issued commercial paper, distinguishing between all types of
paper (i.e., also including unsecured paper), Aa (i.e., highly-rated) ﬁnancial, and Aa asset-backed paper. The
break in the upward trend in correspondence to the late Summer of 2007 is obvious and particularly evident
in the case of asset-backed paper.
Since the beginning of the crisis, it became evident that market collapses would spread in a contagious
fashion. Hedge funds and high-yield investors played a critical role in the cross-border spread of the rupture.
When the prices of the high-risk tranches plummeted and investors could not trade out of their losing positions,
then other assets–especially those with large unrealized gains, such as emerging market equities–were sold
to meet margin calls or to oﬀset losses. Equity markets fell worldwide, and most emerging market currencies
similarly fell in value, although most recovered quickly. The OTC market’s lack of transparency aggravated
the problem because investors, suddenly risk averse, did not know who was–and was not–exposed to the
subprime risk.
During the ﬁrst quarter of 2008, reports of increasing losses and write-downs at major ﬁnancial institutions
in many countries intensiﬁed concerns and resulted in a further, sharp reduction of liquidity in the interbank
and money markets. Banks recognized that the diﬃculties in the markets for mortgages, syndicated loans,
and commercial paper could lead to unanticipated funding needs. As a result, they became much less willing
to provide funding to others, including other banks, especially for terms of more than a few days. Over
the Summer of 2008, a weakening U.S. economy and continued ﬁnancial turbulence led to a broad loss of
conﬁdence in the U.S. ﬁnancial sector. Credit default swap spreads for major banks rose, several large
institutions announced sharp declines in earnings, and anecdotal reports suggested that the ability of most
ﬁnancial ﬁrms to raise new capital was limited. In September 2008, the government-sponsored U.S. enterprises
3Especially in the secondary market of mortgage- and asset-backed securities, broker-dealers, specialized hedge funds, and the
structured investment vehicles banks maintained oﬀ their balance sheets turned out to be highly leveraged and — at the same time
— relying on the least safe risk management strategy: to trade rapidly out of any loss-making position. However, such a strategy,
which relies on markets remaining liquid, failed when markets collapsed.
6Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship by their regulator, Lehman Brothers ﬁled for
bankruptcy, while the insurance company American International Group was rescued by massive government
interventions. As a result of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, a number of prominent money market mutual
fund suﬀered losses which prompted investors to withdraw large amounts; these funds responded by reducing
their purchases of short-term assets, including commercial paper and by shortening the maturity of those
instruments that they purchased, leading to a deterioration in the paper market.4 Figure 1, panel A, shows
an additional steep decline in origination activity in correspondence to September and lasting until early
December 2008. Figure 1, panel B, uses the commercial paper market to visualize the sudden drop in the
market value of outstanding commercial paper (especially of asset-backed type) in correspondence to the
summers of 2007 and 2008. Additionally, credit risk spreads–particularly for structured credit products–
widened dramatically. For instance, the spreads of term federal funds rates and term U.S. dollar Libor over
rates on comparable-maturity overnight index swaps increased signiﬁcantly.5 Figure 2, panel A, shows the
time series of the spreads between the 3-month U.S. dollar Libor rate and an overnight swap-type index rate,
the 3-month OIS rate, and between the U.S. Federal Funds rate and the OIS rate. The OIS rate is a useful
benchmark because, even though it corresponds to the price of an OTC derivative, swaps are by construction
essentially free of counterparty (default) risk. The spikes in late 2007 and, more importantly, in the Fall of
2008 are obvious. Increased spreads over a credit risk-free reference are interesting because they allow the
interpretation of the spreads as risk premia required to compensate the risk of the counterparty in a term
deposit transaction, which is typically a idiosyncratic (i.e., transaction-speciﬁc) risk.
After the September 2008 resolution of another failing U.S. ﬁnancial institution, Washington Mutual,
imposed signiﬁcant losses on debtholders, investors marked down their expectations regarding likely govern-
ment support for the unsecured nondeposit liabilities of ﬁnancial institutions, which further inhibited some
banks from obtain funding (e.g., Wachovia Corp., subsequently acquired by Wells Fargo). Against this back-
drop, investors pulled back from risk-taking even further, funding markets for terms beyond overnight largely
ceased to function, and a wide variety of ﬁnancial ﬁrms experienced diﬃculties in raising capital. Spreads
on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and consumer asset-backed securities (ABS) also widened dramatically.
Figure 2, panel B, visualizes the behavior of spreads over Treasury securities with matching duration for both
a general (including heterogeneous ratings) andAaa portfolios of MBS and ABS (securitized credit card debt
4Outside the U.S., although banks continued to report losses during 2008 and funding conditions remained strained, global
ﬁnancial markets were relatively calm until July-August 2008. This situation changed abruptly in September, as global interbank
markets seized up and lending came to a standstill. These developments were followed by the collapse of several European ﬁnancial
institutions. In late September, Bradford and Bingley, Fortis, and Dexia were partially or fully nationalized, and Hypo Real Estate
received a large capital injection from the German government. The deepening of the crisis led many governments to announce
unprecedented measures to restore credit market functioning, including large-scale capital injections into banks, expansions of
deposit insurance programs, and bank debt guarantees.
5European banks also sought to secure term funding in their domestic currencies, and similar spreads were seen in term euro
and sterling Libor markets. Liquidity in the foreign exchange swap market became poor over this period, and European ﬁrms
found it diﬃcult and costly to use the foreign exchange swap market to swap term funds denominated in euros or other currencies
for funds denominated in dollars.
7pools).6 Starting in late 2007, all spreads increase from a historical average between 300 and 500 basis points
(b.p.) to reach levels in excess of a whopping 1,000 b.p. Additionally, and this is especially obvious for MBS,
starting in mid-2008 the spreads of the overall portfolio climbs well above the Aaa portfolio’s, with spreads
as high as 1,700 b.p. per year. These spreads reﬂect not only credit risk concerns on the solvency of the
originators of the asset-backed securities, but presumably also liquidity concerns related to the market break-
downs discussed above. Figure 3, panel A, documents a similar dynamics for both ﬁxed- and adjustable-rate
MBS (i.e., securitized pools of ﬁxed vs. adjustable rate mortgages), comparing once more Aaa with general
portfolios that also include lower-rated MBS. Although the behavior over time is rather homogeneous and
similar to panel B of Figure 2, ﬁxed-rate MBS have recently shown the steepest increases in the implied
spreads over safer Treasury notes. Figure 3, panel B, concerns instead spreads for commercial paper and
distinguishes between asset-backed and unsecured (non-ﬁnancial) paper. The dynamics is similar to the one
documented for MBS, ABS, and other money market rates, although it is remarkable that spreads have surged
from less than 100 b.p. for the 2000-2006 period to more than 300 (500 for lower rated nonﬁnancial paper)
after Lehman’s crack.
In the stock market, prices tumbled and volatility soared to record levels during the Fall of 2008 as investors
grew more concerned about the prospects of ﬁnancial ﬁrms and about the likelihood of a deep and prolonged
recession. Equity-price declines were widespread across sectors and were accompanied by substantial net
outﬂows from equity mutual funds. During this period, the premium that investors demanded for holding
equity shares–gauged by the gap between the earnings-price ratio and the yield on Treasury securities–shot
up. The dynamics in the spreads of asset-backed securities and commercial paper illustrated in Figures 2 and
3 also translated in very poor performance of non-agency-sponsored subprime MBS and ABS. As an example
of the typical returns generated by the recent ﬁnancial crises, Figure 4 shows total return indices for MBS and
ABS, distinguishing as in Figure 2 between a portfolio collecting all ratings and Aaa securities only. In the
case of MBS, the substantial losses between September 2007 and December 2008 are obvious, with a combined
drop in excess of 30% for Aaa securities and only slightly inferior for the overall portfolio. The loss is also
visible but quantitatively inferior for ABS (approximately 15%) and concentrated during the last 6 months
of 2008. Similar patterns have aﬀected the corporate bond market. After September 2008, CDS spreads
on corporate debt surged, and the yields on both investment grade and high-yield bonds rose dramatically
relative to comparable-maturity Treasury yields. Figure 5 plots the classical Moody’s Aaa-Baa default spread
series as well as the spreads of Aaa and Baa Moody’s portfolios over the yield on 10-year Treasury notes. As
one would expect, the shapes are similar to the ones in Figures 2 and 3, although it is noticeable that the
default spread on corporate bonds has actually increased later than other spreads reviewed above and that
such high spreads appear to have been very resilient in their recent high levels in excess of 300 b.p.
In summary, the recent experience of the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial crisis reveals a number of stylized facts that
6These Bloomberg index portfolios include MBS and ABS issued both by government-sponsored agencies (GSEs, such as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac) and by private companies (commonly called “private labels”). The indices concern ABS and MBS of all
maturities, including short-term ones.
8models of ﬁnancial market dynamics ought to explain:
1. The supply (origination) of newly issued securities in many primary markets (e.g., asset- and mortgage-
backed securities) has completely evaporated, and in many other market it has been severely impaired.
2. At the same time, liquidity–as measured by average bid-ask spreads and by the presence of a supply
of immediacy in trade execution–has disappeared in a number of secondary markets, including highly
rated structured products based on subprime mortgages and other leveraged loan pools.
3. Prices have substantially dropped causing substantial and unprecedented negative returns in a wide
range of ﬁxed income markets. After September 2008 such steep declines have spread to world equity
and corporate bond markets.
4. Correspondingly, yield spreads over duration-matching safe (government) securities on many categories
of asset- and mortgage-backed securities and on corporate bonds have approached all-time high levels.
3. A Primer on Ambiguity and Its Implications
3.1. Generalities
Recent advances in decision theory have focused on models of rational decision-making that are based on
the intuition that in reality individuals may attach great value to a distinction between risk and ambiguity
(also called Knightian uncertainty after the work by Knight, 1921). This distinction is best illustrated by
the famous Ellsberg Paradox (ﬁrst described in Ellsberg, 1961). Ellsberg’s paradox provides a comparison of
diﬀerent attitudes of the same agent when facing alternative sources of uncertainty. Consider the following
situation: there are two diﬀerent urns with 100 colored balls each. In urn number one there are exactly 50 red
balls and 50 black balls, in urn number two the proportion of black and red balls is unknown. When facing
the four gambles:
f = {($100,B 1),($0,R 1)} g = {($100,B 2),($0,R 2)}
m = {($0,B 1),($100,R 1)} n = {($0,B 2),($100,R 2)}
(where ($x,Aj) indicates a gamble that pays out x dollars if a ball of color A is drawn from urn j)p e o p l e
generally prefer f over g and m over n. This preference implies the subjective probability belief that
P(B1) >P(B2) P(R1) >P(R2),
where P(E) is the probability of event E. If the experiment subjects were “sophisticated enough”, then
P(B1)+P(R1)=P(B2)+P(R2)=1m u s th o l d .H o w e v e r ,t h i sr e q u i r e m e n tc a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed by the beliefs
implied by the experiment. Therefore, the experimental outcome cannot be reconciled with any assignment
of subjective probabilities. Ellsberg (1961) and a vast literature after him have pointed out that the fact that
9investors may be averse not only to risk but also to the “uncertainty” (also called ambiguity) concerning the
composition of the second urn may justify the observed choices.
In order to derive a formal deﬁnition of ambiguity and to deﬁne preferences over (dislike for) it, assume
that a decision maker places bets that depend on the result of two coin ﬂips, the ﬁrst is a ﬂip of a coin that
she is familiar with, the second of a coin provided by somebody else. Given that she is not familiar with
the second coin, it is possible that she would consider ambiguous all the bets whose payoﬀ depends on the
result of the second ﬂip. For instance, a bet–call it f–that pays $1 if the second coin lands with heads
up, or equivalently if the event {HH,TH} obtains, represents an ambiguous gamble. If the decision maker is
ambiguity-averse (henceforth, AA), she may therefore see such bets as somewhat less desirable than bets that
are “unambiguous,” i.e., that only depend on the result of the ﬁrst ﬂip. For instance, a bet–call it g–that
pays $1 if the ﬁrst coin lands with heads up, or equivalently if the event {HH,HT} obtains is unambiguous.
However, suppose that we give the decision maker the possibility of buying “shares” in each bet. Then, if she
is oﬀered a bet that pays $0.50 on {HH} and $0.50 on {HT}, she may prefer it to either of the two separate
ambiguous bets that rely on the composition of the second urn. In fact, such a mixture bet has the same
contingent payoﬀs as a bet which pays $0.50 if the ﬁrst coin lands with heads up, which is unambiguous. That
is, a decision maker who is averse to ambiguity may prefer the equal-probability mixture of two ambiguous
bets to either of the bets. In contrast, a decision maker who is attracted to ambiguity may prefer to choose
one of the ambiguous bets. Formally, formally, assuming that the decision maker is indiﬀerent between two
ambiguous bets f and h, Schmeidler (1989) deﬁned ambiguity aversion in terms of preference for any mixture
αf+(1−α)g,α ∈ (0,1) to each of the individual bets. That is, a decision maker is AA if αf+(1−α)g º f ∼ g,
where “º” is a standard preference relation and “∼” indicates indiﬀerence (see MasColell et al., 1995, pp.
42-43).
To develop a more operational deﬁnition to be called into play in Sections 4 and 5, it is useful to review
how decisions under ambiguity have come to be modeled by researchers in economics within the standard
framework of choice under uncertainty. The benchmark framework of choice is represented by Von Neumman
and Morgenstern (1947) expected utility (EU) result, by which a rational agent will choose among alternative,
uncertain prospects (acts) by maximizing the expectation of a standard, cardinal utility index function. Savage
(1954) has generalized classical EU theory providing a Bayesian approach to subjective uncertainty about the
outcomes deriving from acts in which individuals’ subjective distributions of the resulting payoﬀs are derived
from their preferences over stochastic payoﬀ streams and similarly informed investors may disagree about
predicted distributions. In this framework, the stochastic payoﬀ implied by the act (also called lottery or








where the pjs( j =1 ,...,n) represent the subjective probabilities associated to each of the possible n discrete
states of the world and U(·) is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) cardinal utility function. Importantly,
according to Savage’s rationality (in particular, the independence or sure-thing axiom), preferences do not
10depend on the source of the risk. The Savage independence axiom implies that one can simply collapse the
probability weighting across possible models (uncertainty) to the probabilities for payoﬀs (risk) to represent
behavior with a single probability measure over states.
To accommodate for early evidence of behavior by experimental subjects that appeared to be inconsistent
with the subjective EU (SEU) paradigm, Quiggin (1982) has generalized the SEU framework by relaxing the
VNM axioms and, in particular, the independence axiom. Quiggin assumed the existence of a strictly increas-
ing and continuous probability weighting function ν(·) (also called capacity)w h i c hr e ﬂects the “sensitivity” of
people towards probability, i.e., how people react to the very size of their subjective probability assessments
of alternative events. Under Quiggin’s rank dependent utility (RDU), the act x with state-dependent payoﬀs
x1 ≥ x2 ≥ ... ≥ xn, is evaluated according to the functional
n X
j=1
[ν(p1 + p2 + ... + pj) − ν(p1 + p2 + ... + pj−1)]U(xj),
which implies that a gamble f is preferred to g (f % g) if and only if
n X
j=1
[ν(p1 + ... + pj) − ν(p1 + ... + pj−1)]U(fj) ≥
n X
j=1
[ν(p1 + ... + pj) − ν(p1 + ... + pj−1)]U(gj).
It can be shown that as long as the capacity function ν(·) is convex, the above preference functional is
consistent with rational choice and solves many of the experimental puzzles that had created early discomfort
with the SEU choice framework, such as Allais’ (1953) paradox.7 Under RDU preferences, a convex capacity
function is suﬃcient for pessimistic behavior to ensue.
The point of Ellsberg’s paradox is the idea that if a subject has too little information to form a prior, she
will consider a set of priors as possible and that–being AA–she will take into account the minimal expected
utility (over all priors in the set) when evaluating a generic gamble. Schmeidler was the ﬁrst researcher to
formalize and axiomatize this elementary intuition. Schmeidler (1982) started from the observation that the
probability attached to an uncertain event may not reﬂect the full heuristic amount of information that led
to the assignment of that probability. For example, when there are only two possible events H and L,t h e y
are usually–i.e., in the absence of more precise criteria of assessment (Laplace’s principle of indiﬀerence)—
assigned probability 1/2 each, independently of whether the available information is meager or abundant.
Motivated by this consideration, he suggested using a capacity-weighed approach to model rational choice
under uncertainty by assigning non-additive probabilities (meaning that they not add up to 1), or capacities,
in order to allow for recording of information that additive probabilities cannot represent.8 In this sense
the quantity 1 − ν(H) − ν(L) would encode the amount of non-quantiﬁable uncertainty that characterizes
7Probabilities are special cases of capacity functions that satisfy additivity: v(E ∪F)=v(E)+v(F) for two disjoint events E
and F. General capacities need not satisfy additivity. A capacity satisﬁes instead the properties that (i) if the events E,F are in
the state-space Ω,t h e nE ⊆ F implies v(E) ≤ v(F)( m o n o t o n i c i t y )a n d( i i )v(∅)=0 ,v (Ω)=1 .
8Although it may be disturbing that beliefs may be based on probabilities that fail to sum to one, it should be stressed that
in Schmeidler’s (1982) framework, the probabilities, together with the utility function, provide a representation of behavior, and
that the probabilities are not objective probabilities.
11the situation. Formally, Schmeidler (1989) proposed to evaluate a simple gamble that yields payoﬀs H or L
according to a Choquet integral for nonadditive probabilities, which in this simple example reduces to:
min
μ∈C(v)
[μ × H +( 1− μ) × L]
C(v)={μ ∈ [0,1],μ ≥ v(H), 1 − μ ≥ v(L)}, (1)
where v is a capacity and C(v) is called the core of v.9 Here C(v) should be interpreted as the set of eﬀective
priors considered by the agents, and ambiguity is reﬂected by its multi-valued nature. Decision makers express
ambiguity aversion by assigning higher probabilities to unfavorable states, as reﬂected by the min operator.
Clearly, these preferences are of the multiple-prior type, in the sense that a rational decision maker in practice
evaluates expected utility (or outcomes, in the case of (1)) under many alternative sets of beliefs, focussing on
the set (as deﬁned by the parameter μ) that delivers the lowest possible expected utility. In particular, AA in
the sense deﬁned by Schmeidler (1989) results when v is convex. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) went on to show that evaluating uncertain gambles in this fashion represents a sound decision model for
unknown probabilities without subjective probabilities, called Choquet expected utility (CEU). Intuitively,
this novel non-additive expected utility theory coincides with the max-min decision rule, where the set of
possible priors is the core of v. Quiggin’s RDU is a special case of CEU. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) also
proved that (1) maps into a functional representation of preferences for which a gamble f is preferred to g






where Ep[U(·)] is a standard SEU operator when the probability measure is P ∈ ℘,a n dt h es i z eo ft h es e t
℘ can be interpreted as representing the “amount” of perceived ambiguity in the decision problem. Gilboa
and Schmeidler’s (1989) approach yields a utility function deﬁned over payoﬀs as in Savage but rather than
a single prior it yields a set of priors.10
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s max-min preferences leave open the problem of the speciﬁcation of the set ℘
collecting the alternative, multiple priors held by the agents. Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Hansen
and Sargent (2001) noted that multiple-prior criteria for decision-making also appear in the robust control
theory used in engineering. In particular, robust control theory speciﬁes ℘ by taking a single “approximating
model”, that is, an approximating probability distribution, and statistically perturbing it. Often in this
literature, ℘ is parametrized implicitly through some parameter θ such that the higher is θ, the less importance
is given to alternative models deviating from the baseline approximating probability distribution. Hansen and
Sargent (2001) have recognized that the uncertainty that characterizes a preference relation that reﬂects
a concern for robustness may derive from ambiguity and, more speciﬁcally, from the poor quality of the
information used to select a model. Therefore, θ can be thought of as an AA index since it measures the
9The core of a capacity v consists of all ﬁnitely additive probability measures that majorize v pointwise (i.e., event-wise).
10In the Ellsberg framework this model implies that the individual acts as if she has a set of priors for the ambiguous urn which
includes a prior in which the probability of red is less than 0.5 and a prior in which the probability of black is less than 0.5. Since
she acts as if she evaluates each act according to its minimum expected utility she will never chose the ambiguous urn as in her
pessimistic view it will be unlikely to pay out.
12fear for model misspeciﬁcation. The lower is the agent’s θ, the higher is her aversion to ambiguity. Formally,
Hansen and Sargent (2001) derived robustness-sensitive preferences from robust control theory that imply






where P is the approximating, baseline probability distribution and R(Q||P) is the Kullback—Leibler diver-
gence measure between Q and P.
Hansen and Sargent’s robustness-driven preferences have been fully “axiomatized”–i.e., shown to be
consistent with rational choice under uncertainty–only later on by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini
(2006) as a speciﬁc sub-class of what they have labeled variational preferences. Variational preferences (VPs)
are simply characterized by a utility function U(·) and a convex function c deﬁned on the standard simplex
that is called ambiguity index, since diﬀerent values of c determine diﬀerent ambiguity levels. VPs imply that
a gamble f is preferred to g (f º g) if and only if:
min
P∈∆
EP[U(f)] + c(P) ≥ min
P∈∆
EP[U(g)] + c(P).
In words, agents consider all possible probabilistic models in ∆,g i v i n gw e i g h tc(P)t oe a c ho ft h e m . T h e
minimization over P ∈ ∆ is aimed at seeking robustness against the possibility of a mistake in the choice
of the model of reference. The cautious attitude featured by VP agents can also be viewed as the result of
the eﬀect that an adversarial inﬂuence, a malevolent Nature, has on the realizations of the state. Under this
view, Nature chooses a probability measure P over states with the objective of minimizing agents utility,
conditional on their choice of an act and under the constraint that the probability P has to be chosen in a
ﬁxed set ∆. c(P) is then the cost paid by the malevolent Nature to induce the probability distribution P.
This interpretation of the model provides an intuitive notion of AA, which can be regarded as the agents
diﬃdence for any lack of precise deﬁnition of the uncertainty involved in a choice, something that provides
room for the malevolent inﬂuence of Nature. Importantly, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) show
that VPs are consistent with a set of axioms that characterize rational choices under uncertainty. Moreover,
VPs have the advantage of nesting many of the previously known preferences structures that (may) imply
AA. For instance, setting
c(P)=
(
1i f P ∈ ℘
0i f P 6∈ ℘
with ℘ ⊂ ∆, one obtains the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Instead, noting
that R(P||Q) is a convex function and setting c(P)=R(P||Q) one may derive Hansen and Sargent’s (2001)
robustness representation.
3.2. Previous Research on Ambiguity and Market Break-Downs
Dow and Werlang (1992) have investigated some implications of decision making under ambiguity for optimal
portfolio choice which generalize the standard SEU framework. Their results have direct application to explain
13market breakdowns. In their paper they analyze the simplest investment decision, namely where there is only
one uncertain asset. Under standard SEU theory, an agent who must allocate her wealth between one safe
and one risky asset will buy some of the risky asset if its price is less than the expected value of its future
payoﬀs. Conversely the agent will sell the risky asset short when the price is greater than its expected payoﬀs.
This is the local risk-neutrality result that has been known since the seminal work by Arrow (1965). Dow and
Werlang’s (1992) main ﬁnding is a generalization of this result to the case of AA with one striking diﬀerence.
In the case of a SEU decision maker, the threshold between optimal purchases and sales is represented by
one single value for the current price. The exact amount of the asset that is bought or sold will then depend
on the agent’s risk aversion. Consequently an agent’s demand for an asset should be positive below a certain
price, negative above that price, and zero at exactly that price. On the contrary, under AA, Dow and Werlang
prove that there is an interval of prices within which the agent neither buys nor sells short the asset. At prices
below the lower limit of this interval, the agent is willing to buy this asset; at prices above the upper end of
this interval, the agent is willing to sell the asset short. When equilibrium forces fail to push the asset price
outside this interval, there will be no willingness to trade and the market will break down (equivalently, the
agent rationally chooses non participation). Formally, let P be a probability measure and A ⊂ Ω an event
deﬁned on the Ω algebra. The AA of agent P at A is deﬁned by:
v(P,A)=1− P(A) − P(Ac).
This number measures the amount of probability “lost” because of AA. It gives the deviation of P from
additivity at A. Dow and Werlangs show that v(P,A) ≥ v(Q,A) is equivalent to saying that for all random
variables X for which the integrals are ﬁnite,
−EP[−X] − EP[X] ≥− EQ[−X] − EQ[X]
holds. The diﬀerence on either side can be interpreted as the range of prices such that a (weakly) risk-averse
investor holds no position in the asset. With a non-additive probability measure, the expectation of a random
variable is less than the negative of the expectation of the negative of the random variable, and this creates a
no-trade interval. A risk averse or risk neutral investor with given initial wealth W,w h oi sf a c e dw i t ha na s s e t
which yields X per share and whose unit price is p>0, will buy the asset if p<E [X]a n do n l yi fp ≤ E[X].
He will sell the asset if p>−E[−X] and only if p ≥− E(−X). Section 4 provides an example that further
clariﬁes the intuition behind Dow and Werlang’s ﬁndings.
Mukerji and Tallon (1999) extend Dow and Werlang’s (1992) partial equilibrium results by showing that
also in equilibrium ambiguity and AA may cause investors to restrict their trading to a set of assets narrower
than what would be found under SEU; in particular, investor may optimally trade only assets that are the least
aﬄicted by ambiguity, i.e., the assets with respect to which agents are less likely to make diﬃcult-to-quantify
errors. Speciﬁcally, in Mukerji and Tallon’s model ambiguity leads to a collapse in the trade of ﬁnancial
assets whose payoﬀ is greatly aﬀected by idiosyncratic risk when the range of variation of the idiosyncratic
component in assets’ payoﬀs is large relative to the range of variation of systematic risk, and the ambiguity
14of agents’ beliefs about the idiosyncratic component is suﬃciently large. Because it is well-known that in
standard SEU models, under complete markets the risk-sharing is perfect and Pareto optimal allocations will
obtain, it is clear that theoretically, the eﬀect of ambiguity aversion is to make the risk sharing opportunities
less complete than it would otherwise be (see also Epstein, 2001). Thus, ambiguity aversion is identiﬁed
as a cause of market breakdowns: assets are there to be traded which may in principle facilitate optimal
risk-sharing arrangements; however, agents, because of aversion towards ambiguity, prefer to hold on to their
(suboptimal) endowments, rather than bear the ambiguity associated with holding the assets. Moreover, the
eﬀects of the presence of idiosyncratic risks cannot be simply removed by standard diversiﬁcation techniques
based on the law of large numbers, as it is under SEU. In fact, even under ambiguity the law of large numbers
works in the usual way (that has to be); what is diﬀerent is that, because the investors’ knowledge is consistent
with more than one probability distribution, there is more than one mean to converge to.
Rutledge and Zin (2001) argue that the major puzzle posed by a ﬁnancial crisis is not the large change in
asset prices but instead the fact that extreme market outcomes are often followed by a lack of liquidity and
trade: people seem to stop trading exactly when events ought to force them to trade more aggressively, and this
seems hardly rational. Empirically, market collapse episodes seem to have been acute for markets where traders
rely heavily on speciﬁc empirical models of asset price dynamics, such as in derivative markets. Moreover, the
observed behavior of traders and institutions usually places a large emphasis on “worst-case scenarios” through
the use of stress testing and value-at-risk methodologies which departs from what classical ﬁnance theory
suggests. Rutledge and Zin investigate the connection between AA and liquidity and in particular, whether
severe reductions in the provision of liquidity may result from AA when all these features are incorporated
in a model. Because they wish to study the relationship between liquidity and uncertainty rather than
market microstructure per se, they specify a simple market mechanism in which the demand for the derivative
is summarized by the arrival of a random, exogenous willingness-to-trade signal.11 After the arrival of a
request to trade, the market maker also chooses an optimal consumption and investment in the risky asset.
The investment in the risky asset after observing a trade in the derivative allows the market maker the
opportunity to hedge the realized position in the derivative market.12 Rutledge and Zin focus on the bid and
ask prices for a proprietary derivative security. The bid-ask spread and the associated probability that the
market maker will make a trade are treated as a measures of liquidity. The market-maker for the derivative
is assumed to be a monopolist in that market while the market for the underlying security is frictionless. The
market maker chooses bid and ask prices for the derivative to optimally trade-oﬀ the probability of attracting
a seller or buyer to aﬀect current proﬁts with the future utility implications implied from a trade in the
derivative. When there is ambiguity about the probability distribution for the underlying security’s cash
ﬂows, the market-maker is uncertain about these future, dynamic consequences, which they model through an
11If the signal ˜ vt is greater than or equal to the posted ask price, at, then a ”buy order” is received and the market maker must
g os h o r to n ec a l l ,a tp r i c eo fat. If the willingness-to-trade ˜ vt is less than or equal to the posted bid price, bt,t h e nt h em a r k e t
maker must go long and call, at a price of bt.I f˜ vt lies between the bid and ask prices, no trade takes place.
12However the derivative position can never be perfectly hedged since they consider only a single risky asset available for trade.
For ambiguity-aversion to play a role in the bid-ask spread of a derivative it is necessary the derivative cannot be perfectly hedged.
15Epstein and Wang (1994)-type AA, recursive utility function.13 Routledge and Zin ﬁnd that AA increases the
bid-ask spread and, hence, reduces liquidity. More interestingly, their inﬁnite-horizon example produces short-
lived but dramatic decreases in liquidity in the face of large shocks even though the underlying environment
is stationary. Interestingly, while in some situations, AA manifests itself simply as pessimism–that is, an
AA individual is identical to a standard SEU individual with a pessimistic beliefs–at other times AA is of
ﬁrst-order importance and the resulting behavior is distinct from any admissible SEU agent across beliefs.
One last paper related to ours is Easley and O’Hara (2005, 2006), who investigate the role that carefully
designed market microstructures can play in reducing the ambiguity confronting AA traders. They develop
a model with SEU-maximizing traders and naive, ambiguity-averse traders, and show how the na¨ ıve traders
can choose to participate or not participate in markets. They ﬁnd that speciﬁc features of the microstructure
(listing and delisting rules, trading halts, transparency, price collars and daily limits, “public comes ﬁrst”
rules, clearing house rules and margin requirements, etc.) can reduce the perceived ambiguity, and induce
participation by both ﬁrms and issuers. Their analysis demonstrates how designing markets to reduce ambi-
guity can beneﬁt investors through greater liquidity, exchanges through greater volume and trading fees, and
issuing ﬁrms through a lower cost of capital.
4. Ambiguity and Market Break-Downs: A Simple No-Trade Example
To provide in the simplest possible terms the intuition for how and when ambiguity aversion may cause
a market to breakdown, in this Section we study a simple partial equilibrium, one-period security market
economy in which two agents can trade two diﬀerent securities. The asset menu is composed of a set of risky
assets and a completely riskless money market account. The money market account can be thought of as an
inﬂation-protected saving account (in which case its real return can be set to be constant and zero). The
risky assets are claims to streams of proﬁts and are heterogeneous because they are written on the output of
diﬀerent ﬁrms. Ex-ante, the risky securities are completely homogeneous because diﬀerent ﬁrms cannot be
told apart so that all stocks trade at a price q and eﬀectively, one can speak of a single risky security.14 The
structure of the asset market is exogenously given. We later consider any possible, welfare-improving changes
of such a structure. The two types of securities are all in zero net supply (i.e., they are endogenous assets,
similar to corporate bonds or derivatives, see Mukerji and Tallon, 2001). Section 5 relaxes this assumption
and considers securities in net exogenous supply. We deﬁne rf as the real, riskless interest rate. The money
market account has initial prices of 1, so that its ﬁnal payoﬀ is 1 + rf.
There are two investors, both averse to ambiguity, indexed by m =1 ,2. At time 0, each of the two
investors decides the optimal composition of a self-ﬁnancing portfolio, i.e., the number of shares of the risky
13This speciﬁcation for recursive preferences facilitates dynamic programming and preserves dynamic consistency.
14As an alternative, one can think of diﬀerent securities as derivatives issued on the diﬀerent pools of cash ﬂows. The structure
of the pools is so complex, that ex-ante is impossible to tell diﬀerent pools apart. In this case, the relevant analogy is represented
by asset-backed securities written on pools of loans of heterogeneous credit quality which are diﬃcult to analyze ex-ante, before
time elapses and borrowers are called to service their loans. However, we refrain from modelling the reasons preventing information
on the structure and likely performance of the pools to be gathered and sold.
16asset, zm, and of the riskless bond, bm, to be held between times 0 and 1. This is done in view of maximizing
some monotone increasing (possibly concave) utility index that depends on the investor’s ﬁnal wealth. For
concreteness and to better highlight the role played by ambiguity, we focus in this example on a risk-neutral
investor that simply maximizes expected ﬁnal wealth (see Epstein and Schneider, 2008, for a similar choice).
Section 5 considers a more standard risk-aversion assumption. We denote by wm ≡ (zm,b m)0 the vector of
portfolio shares held by agent m.
The stochastic environment is deﬁned by the state space Ω. For simplicity, we consider a simple, discrete
state space. Uncertainty is resolved at time 1 when the aggregate state of the economy can be either of high
output (yH, i.e., a state of expansion) or low output (yL, a recession), Ω = {H, L}. Aggregate output is high
with probability π>0 and low with probability 1−π>0, respectively. However, the payoﬀ of the risky asset
is not only inﬂuenced by the overall state of the economy–which deﬁnes systematic, aggregate risk–but
also by circumstances peculiar to each risky asset, i.e., idiosyncratic risk. In practice, this means that while
the realization of the systematic state σ ∈ Ω inﬂuences the pricing of all existing securities, the risky asset
is also characterized by an asset-speciﬁcs t a t eκ ∈ {−1, 1} which represents the heterogeneous realization of
cash ﬂows within each ﬁrm. While good and bad projects cannot be told apart before buying a security, and
all projects are ex-ante identical and indistinguishable, after a risky asset has been purchased, its payoﬀ will
also be inﬂuenced by the realization of the idiosyncratic component. Such a component may be either good
(outcome +1) and add to the systematic payoﬀ with probability p>0 or bad (outcome −1) and subtract
from the systematic payoﬀ with probability 1 − p>0. Overall, the stochastic environment is described by
the product state space Ω0 = Ω×{−1,1}. For concreteness, in the following we use the following parameters:
yH =3 ,yL =2 ,y(1) = 1, y(−1) = −1.
We later generalize our conclusions to the case in which yH, yL, y(1), and y(−1) can take any real values.
The example is completed by the presence of a government, a central planner that performs two functions.
First, using un-modelled economic policy tools, the government aﬀects the inﬂation rate, i.F o r s i m p l i c i t y ,
the inﬂation rate can only be high or low, ihigh >i low.T h ep o l i c ym a k e r sa ﬀect the probability ρ>0o fa
high inﬂation rate. Second, the policy maker may ex-ante change the features of the environment–e.g., the
state-space–in order to favor “better” overall outcomes. An example of a better outcome is to favor trade in
securities when otherwise there would be no trade.
The possible realizations of the risky asset’s payoﬀ, expressed in nominal terms, are as follows:
ω ∈ Ω0 Probability yσ + y(κ) σ ∈ Ω,κ ∈ {−1, 1}
H,1 πp 4
H,−1 π(1 − p) 2
L,1 (1 − π)p 3
L,−1 (1 − π)(1 − p) 1
Figure 6
17Necessary conditions for clearing all markets at an equilibrium are:
b1 + b2 =0 z1 + z2 =0 .
Assuming that the portfolio wm is self-ﬁnancing, the budget constraint for agent m is bm+zmq =0 ,m =1 ,2.
4.1. Standard (subjective) expected utility analysis
Assume that all the relevant probability distributions, (π,1 − π)a n d( p,1 − p), on the state space Ω0 are
k n o w ni na d v a n c e .D e n o t eb yEρ[·] the expected value operator under the probability distribution (ρ,1 − ρ).
Without loss of generality, let’s label as 1 the agent interested in buying the risky asset and with 2 the agent
who is considering selling the risky asset. Because the risky asset is in zero net supply, these assignments are
sensible. Letting i ∈ {ilow,i high}, the payoﬀ matrices (expressed in real terms) for the buyer and the seller of
the risky asset are as follows. For agent 1, the prospective buyer of the asset (i.e., such that z1 > 0), we have:
State at time 1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1


























,i nc a s es t a t e( H,1) realizes. Therefore, the








Using the self-ﬁnancing condition we can express b1 as a function of z1 and q,t h a ti s ,b1 = −z1q. Plugging













































18For agent 2, the prospective seller of the asset (i.e., such that z2 < 0), the payoﬀ matrix is:
State at time 1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1






























,i nc a s es t a t e( L,−1) realizes. Therefore, the








Once more, to derive an expression for the risky asset price below which z2 < 0 is guaranteed, we use the
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which implies that q
¯
buy > ¯ qsell. This ranking of the two reservation prices is important because it proves
that a risky price q can be found such that q
¯
buy ≥ q ≥ ¯ qsell and trading may always occur in the SEU case.
What the exact price q at which the market clears will be, depends on the preferences of the two individuals
as well as on the jointly determined nominal bond yields and money market account real yields that clear the
remaining two markets. However, what matters is that in a standard SEU framework–when all (subjective)
probabilities are known in advance or, equivalently, there is a unique prior on possible states of the world–in
general prices will exist such that there is trading and risky asset markets will clear. Of course, such prices
may become at times very high or low; moreover, they may erratically jump, as new information arrives
and/or preferences change. In any event, the security market will always express such a price as a result of
buying and selling activities by traders and liquidity (the readiness to buy and sell at diﬀerent prices) and
trading volumes will be non-zero.
194.2. No trading under ambiguity aversion
Next, we assume that agents have no information on the probability distribution for idiosyncratic risk, (1−p,p).
Following Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) axiomatic foundation of AA, we model AA investors as choosing a
portfolio to maximize their minimum expected utility over Ω0. This means that there are multiple priors and
that each (type of) agent focusses on the states of the world that are most unfavorable. This is the sense in
which an agent’s subjective knowledge about the likelihood of the possible events is consistent with more than
one probability distribution: what the agent knows does not inform him of a precise (second-order) probability
distribution over the set of possible (ﬁrst-order) probabilities. Therefore, for the agent who buys the risky
asset, the relevant prior is the one that assigns zero probability (p = 0) to the good idiosyncratic risk state
κ =1 ,w h i l et h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ef o rt h es e l l e r( p = 1), where certainty is assigned to the good idiosyncratic
risk state κ = 1. In such an ambiguous situation, the payoﬀ matrices considered by the buyer and seller of
the risky asset are as follows. For the prospective buyer of the risky asset (z1 > 0):
State at time 1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1
























In this case the agent will not buy the risky asset as it will be perceived as being too expensive, given an AA
assessment of its payoﬀs. As for the prospective seller of the risky asset (z2 < 0), the matrix of payoﬀsi s :
State at time 1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1






















In this case the agent will refrain from selling (shorting) the risky asset because it is considered too expensive.

























However, since the prospective buyer buys risky securities only for q ≤ q
¯
AA
buy < ¯ qAA
sell (i.e., for suﬃciently low




buy (i.e., for suﬃciently high
20prices), it is clear that the two conditions (inequalities) cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed, so that trading
breaks down. This means that a range of market prices exist such that the prospective buyer considers the
price too high while the prospective seller considers the price simultaneously too low. This is made possible
by the fact that the two agents do not reduce their knowledge of the stochastic environment to a single,
unique and common prior over states of the world. On the contrary, each investor takes decisions assuming
as a benchmark the worst-case scenario, in this case parameterized by the bad idiosyncratic state shock.




sell], the result is that all liquidity evaporates
and trading disappears. As a result, the market will clear with z1 = z2 = 0 (no trading activity) which is
equivalent to say that the market breaks down and fails to determine an equilibrium price.
4.3. Generalizing the example: the role of idiosyncratic risk
Thus far, out example has used speciﬁc values for the payoﬀs in order to show that AA may lead to a collapse
in trading activity, and that such a collapse may occur only outside the SEU paradigm. In this section, we
remove this restrictive feature and show that trading may collapse when ambiguity concerns both systematic
and idiosyncratic risks, under the assumption that the “amount” (to be deﬁned) of ambiguity concerning
idiosyncratic risk exceeds the uncertainty on the systematic risk. Speciﬁcally, we show that the chances that
a market may break down will depend on the relationship between the range of variation of the idiosyncratic
component, ∆κ, and that of systematic risk, ∆σ.L e t y(−1) and yL be given, so that y(1) and yH can be
alternatively expressed as:
yH = yL + ∆σ y(1) = y(−1) + ∆κ,
where ∆σ ≡ yH −yL > 0a n d∆κ ≡ y(1)−y(−1) > 0. Notice that if the ranking of the payoﬀs in the possible
states were to depend on the relationship between ∆σ and ∆κ, then the following relationships would hold,
∆κ > ∆σ =⇒ yH + y(1) >y L + y(1) >y H + y(−1) >y L + y(−1)
∆κ = ∆σ =⇒ yH + y(1) >y L + y(1) = yH + y(−1) >y L + y(−1)
∆κ < ∆σ =⇒ yH + y(1) >y H + y(−1) >y L + y(1) >y L + y(−1),
where the central inequalities depend on the ranking across ∆κ and ∆σ. Under the SEU paradigm, similarly
to what we have seen before, the payoﬀ matrices for the prospective buyer and seller of the risky asset are as
follows. For a prospective buyer (m =1 ,2):
S t a t ea tt i m e1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1





















21Using the self-ﬁnancing condition for the potential buyer, b1 + z1q = 0, the expected payoﬀ of her portfolio





















As for the seller of the risky asset, following similar steps, it is easy to show that the expected payoﬀ of the















































































which implies that q
¯





may always occur. This shows that the exact values for yH, yL, y(1), and y(−1) in our earlier example are
irrelevant for the SEU analysis.
Let’s examine now the AA case. As before, for an agent who is a prospective buyer of the risky asset, the
relevant prior is the one that assigns probability 0 (p = 0) to the good idiosyncratic risk state κ =1 ,w h i l et h e
opposite is true for the seller (p = 1), where certainty is assigned to the good idiosyncratic risk state κ =1 .
The payoﬀ matrices considered by the prospective buyer and seller of the risky asset are as follows. For the
prospective buyer,
State at time 1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1

























In this case the agent will not buy the risky asset. Similarly, for the prospective seller, the payoﬀ matrix is
State at time 1 Cost of strategy at time 0 Real payoﬀ at time 1










































































sell =( ∆σ − ∆ι)/
¡
(1 + rf)Eρ [1 + i]
¢
≥ 0 and that trade
will in principle occur.15 The most interesting case occurs when ∆σ < ∆κ–the quantity of idiosyncratic risk
as the deﬁned by the range of variation ∆κ exceeds the quantity of systematic risk ∆σ–and q
¯
AA




(1 + rf)Eρ [1 + i]
¢
< 0, i.e., q
¯
AA
buy < ¯ qAA




buy < ¯ qAA





buy (i.e., for suﬃciently high prices), and the two conditions (inequalities) are inconsistent. Therefore trading
breaks down.16
4.4. Initial thoughts on policy implications
The simple example in this Section highlights what is the most important driving force behind the possibility
that ambiguity may lead to breakdowns in the markets for risky assets: the relative “amounts” of idiosyncratic
and systematic risk, say the ratio ∆σ/∆κ.T h eﬁrst, straightforward implication for policy-making is that any
change in the environment that may move a ratio ∆σ/∆κ < 1 to levels that exceed 1 (i.e., to shift risk away






16Clearly, our earlier example with y
H =3 ,y
L =2 ,y(1) = 1, and y(−1) = −1i m p l i e s∆σ =1< ∆κ = 2 and satisﬁes this
condition.
23from the idiosyncratic components and towards the systematic ones) may lead to a switch from a situation in
which trading has collapsed to a standard SEU-type result in which trade always occurs and the price adjusts
accordingly. Arguably, the 2007-2008 crisis has been characterized by widespread and persistent episodes of
market failure caused by a sudden increase in the perception of the relative importance of idiosyncratic vs.
systematic risk, see Section 2. For instance, while the world economy had not yet entered a global recession
(i.e., while systemic risk was probably still moderate), starting in the Fall of 2007, term interbank funding
markets in the U.S. and Europe have repeatedly come under pressure. Banks recognized that the diﬃculties
in the markets for mortgages, syndicated loans, and commercial paper could lead to substantially larger-
than-anticipated calls on their funding capacity. Moreover, creditors found they could not reliably determine
the size of their counterparties’ potential exposures to those markets, and concerns about valuation practices
added to the overall uncertainty. As a result, banks became much less willing to provide funding to others,
including other banks, especially for terms of more than a few days and independently of the ruling price of
credit, which is a typical episode of trading collapse. This can be interpreted as a sudden, major re-assessment
of the amount of idiosyncratic risk featured by a number of interconnected world ﬁnancial markets. In our
simple example, the initial diﬃculties in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage markets may have triggered a progressive
decline in the risk composition ratio ∆σ/∆κ, to gradually decline below 1.17
Ad i ﬀerent set of issues revolves around the tools that policy makers may employ to aﬀect the ratio
∆σ/∆κ. Although our example is extremely stylized, we can provide a preliminary answer that pertains to
the economic environment we have been using. Suppose that the government sets up a comprehensive mutual
fund with the goal to purchase all the existing shares of the risky asset issued by all the existing ﬁrms. Since
the fund is pooling all risks, it is clear that the return on the fund will be yH in the good aggregate state, and
yL in the bad state. All of the idiosyncratic risk disappears, because while for some ﬁrms it will be y(1) > 0,
for other ﬁrms idiosyncratic will be negative and by deﬁnition y(1)+y(−1) = 0. The fund stands ready to be
the counterparty for all transactions (both purchases and sales) involving the risky stock and delivers payoﬀs
of zmyσ (negative or positive, depending on the sign of zm) to the investors. At this point, the existence of any
idiosyncratic risk has become irrelevant to both the fund/market maker and the investors. As such—after the
creation of the fund—it must be ∆σ > ∆
fund
κ = 0 and trading in the shares issued by the fund will generically
occur. Because trading may occur in a market economy only when it leads to an improvement in (perceived,
subjective) welfare, it is imaginable that each of the two investors may be ready to pay a “tax” (a fee, with
an upper bound given by the certainty equivalent of the lowest increase in their respective welfare levels) to
support the creation and the functioning of this fund. Naturally, some of the policy actions enacted in a
number of countries during 2008 suggest that–although mostly as a response to speciﬁce v e n t s – t h i sm a y
have happened to some extent, as part of an eﬀort to “jump start” credit markets that had otherwise faltered.
17In our example, it is only the composition ratio ∆σ/∆κ that matters in determining whether or not ambiguity aversion may
cause trading disruptions. In particular, the probability (ρ)o fah i g hi n ﬂation rate or the “other asset” rates of returns R and r
f
have no eﬀect on whether the trading mechanism may fail because they do not aﬀect the ratio (∆σ − ∆κ)/(1 + R). We shall see
in Section 5 than in more complicated set ups, this is not always the case.
245. Parametric Ambiguity, Endogenous Participation and Equilibrium Asset Pricing
We investigate a simple, one-period security economy in which two types of investors may trade in two (types
of) securities, a risky asset in positive (¯ z) net exogenous supply and an endogenous bond (i.e., in zero net
supply).18 The bond is again interpretable as a riskless money market account that yields a return rf.T h e
bond trades for a current, unit price. Also in this case, the risky assets are ex-post heterogeneous, in the sense
that they represent rights to the output (proﬁts) of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Ex-ante however, these stocks are
completely homogeneous because diﬀerent ﬁrms cannot be told apart; therefore all stocks trade at a unique
price q. The rest of the framework is identical to the example in Section 4. We model two kinds of risk: risk
that aﬀects the entire market (systematic risk) and risk that just reﬂects circumstances peculiar to the speciﬁc
ﬁrm represented by a stock (idiosyncratic risk). The systematic component of the stock payoﬀ is normally
distributed, with mean μS and variance σ2
S. Also the idiosyncratic component is normally distributed, with
parameters μI and σ2
I. The policy-maker/central planner performs two functions. First, using un-modelled
economic policy tools, it sets the inﬂa t i o nr a t ea ts o m el e v e li. Second, the policy maker may ex-ante change
features of the environment to favor “better” outcomes.
Call d the total payoﬀ on the stock. Because systematic and idiosyncratic risks are independent, we have




m the initial wealth of agent m, each investor’s budget constraint is given by
w0
m = qzm + bm,





+ bm(1 + rf).

















Finally, assume that the utility index of each agent is given by a standard exponential, CARA utility, u(w1
m)=
−exp(−w1
m).19 Under this condition, given the normality assumption, the expected utility of ﬁnal wealth is


















18This model shares a number of features with Easley and O’Hara’s (2006), even though the set of questions and implications
we are after diﬀer to a large extent from theirs.
19This speciﬁcation for preferences implies a unit CARA coeﬃcient, but all of our qualitative implications will go through
assuming a diﬀerent risk aversion coeﬃcient, at the cost of more involved algebra. The exact distribution of any initial endowment
owned by the investors does not aﬀect their demands for risky assets because of the CARA-Gaussian structure, so we do not
specify it.
25where the budget constraint has been substituted in. Therefore, since w0






























5.1. Standard (subjective) expected utility analysis
If agents are SEU maximizers, they consider as plausible a unique probability distribution for the idiosyn-
cratic component of the asset’s payoﬀ: they consider the unique pair (μI,σ2
I)0 as suﬃcient statistics for the
distribution of idiosyncratic risk. The expected utility of the end-of-period-one wealth is a strictly increasing
transformation of the kernel (6), which is a concave function of the investment share zm. Therefore necessary












which gives an optimal risky investment of:
z∗
m =





This is the demand for the risky asset expressed as a function of its price and the mean and the variance of
its payoﬀs. A simple inspection of (7) reveals that the sign z∗
m depends on the relation between the price of
















Note that there is a unique price q =( μI + μS)/(1 + i) that supports the optimal decision not to invest in
the risky asset. This means that for q 6=( μI +μS)/(1+i), investors will generally express a non-zero demand
and trading may occur.
5.2. Risky asset demand under ambiguity
Assume now that at least some fraction of the agents know the exact distribution of the systematic component
of the asset’s payoﬀ, but do not know the exact value of the parameters of the distribution of the idiosyncratic
component. AA agents would select a portfolio to maximize expected utility if they knew the correct value
of the parameters, but they do not know the parameters, and unlike expected utility maximizers they do not
aggregate across parameters with a unique prior. Similarly to Section 4, we assume that AA investors act as if
they had a set of distributions on returns; one distribution for each possible value of the unknown parameters.
AA investors can be thought of as inexperienced potential investors who do not have enough experience in
the market to reliably estimate return distributions.20
20For instance, AA investors may have not yet participated in the asset market, and although they can imagine many possible
return distributions, they are unable to place a prior on this set of distributions. Consequently, these investors do not average
26In particular, AA investors only know that the mean μI of the distribution belongs to the set {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P},
and the variance σ2







with P ≥ 2a n dQ ≥ 2. To make our analysis of the equilib-
rium interaction between SEU and AA interesting, we assume that AA investors consider as possible mean
payoﬀsa b o v ea n db e l o wμI and variances above and below σ2
I. That is, the true parameter values are convex
combinations of the extreme values considered possible by the AA traders. Being AA, investors consider as
relevant the prior that is less favorable to themselves, i.e., they select a portfolio to maximize their minimum
expected utility over the set of possible return distributions. Therefore, the optimization problem for each















m = qzm + bm
































Given the deﬁnition of V (w1
m), it easy to prove that














































Interestingly, for any portfolio the minimum occurs at the maximum possible level for the variance of future
payoﬀs. Denote this variance as σ2
max. Consequently, what matters to an AA investor is not the “expected”,
average variance, but rather the largest variance. The fact that μI is replaced by μmin if the investor intends
to invest in the asset, while μI is replaced by μmax in case she intends to go short, makes sense because it is
clear that an investor short in a security bears the maximum possible loss in case the security payoﬀ is very
high as she has to deliver such a payoﬀ to the counterparty in the short position.












from which we get
z∗
m =






m > 0o n l yi fμmin + μS − q(1 + i) > 0, that is, only if (μmin + μS)/(1 + i) >q .V i c e v e r s a , i f












over the possible distributions of outcomes the way an SEU investor does, but rather they evaluate the utility implications of all
alternative actions (here, portfolio selections) under each possible distribution.
27from which we get
z∗
m =






m < 0o n l yi fμmax +μS −q(1 + i) < 0, that is, only if (μmax +μS)/(1 + i) <q . Summarizing the



































for which it is optimal not to trade the risky asset. This occurs because each agent evaluates the possibility
of buying or selling the risky asset using diﬀerent probability measures (namely, distributions characterized
by diﬀerent mean payoﬀs μmin and μmax, respectively). In particular, (μmin +μS)/(1 + i) is the highest price
at which investors are willing to buy the asset: when q exceeds this bound, there will be no buyers of the
risky asset. (μmax + μS)/(1 + i) is the lowest price at which investors are willing to sell the asset: when q
goes below this bound, sellers disappear. Therefore, the eﬀect of AA is directly observable on the lowest oﬀer
and the highest bid prices.21 It is also interesting to stress that (10) is completely independent of σ2
max:t h e
perceived variance does not aﬀect the decision to trade (or to go long or short in the asset); however, once
such a decision is taken, then σ2
max will inﬂuence the size of the position.
Figure 14
21Under SEU, the agent considers only μI, therefore the two extremes of the interval coincide, and the switch from buying to
selling occurs exactly at the price (μI + μS)/(1 + i).
28Figure 14 illustrates this result: while under SEU the security demand function has a standard downward
sloping shape and–because of the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion– it appears to be linear in q,
under AA the demand function is piece-wise linear and ﬂat at z∗
m = 0 over the no-trading interval (10). This
is the same result obtained in Section 4: while under SEU trading generically occurs, under AA a relatively
wide interval of prices may exist in which a market breaks down.22 Notice also that because σI ≤ σmax,t h e
position in the risky asset held by AA agents is always smaller (in absolute value) than the one held by SEU
agents. This is because for any given return parameters these investors evaluate the trade-oﬀ between mean
and variance equivalently. They both avoid risk and require compensation in expected return in order to hold
risk. But an AA investor also avoids ambiguity in the distribution of returns, and so as long as the set of
possible means and variances is non-degenerate she further reduces the size of his position in the risky asset.
Finally, because μmin ≤ μI ≤ μmax, when it is optimal for an ambiguity averse agent to buy the risky asset,
so it is for a SEU agent. Similarly, when it is optimal for an ambiguity averse agents to sell the risky asset,
so it is for a SEU agent. This is obvious from Figure 14.
5.3. Equilibrium asset prices
Diﬀerently from the example in Section 4, besides showing the existence of a region in the price space for
which trading collapses, in this Section we further proceed to “close” the model and compute the equilibrium
price for the stock. For additional realism, let us assume that a fraction α of the agents is AA, while the
complement to one, 1−α, are SEU-maximizers. However, agents in each of the two groups are homogeneous
and hold identical beliefs (multiple priors in the AA case). We denote by z∗
AA the asset demand by AA agents
(so that αz∗
AA is the aggregate demand by their group), and by z∗
SEU the asset demand of SEU agents (so that
(1 − α)z∗
SEU is the aggregate demand by their group). The market clearing condition for the stock market
is ¯ z = αz∗
AA +( 1− α)z∗
SEU. At this point, three possible situations can occur. First, it is possible that the







In this case z∗
AA = 0 and the entire supply of the stock must be absorbed by SEU agents. Therefore




(1 − α)=¯ z,
















1 ≤ (μmax + μS)/(1 + i), it follows that only if the additional condition








22Interestingly, even outside the no-trading interval, the demand function under AA appears to be less sensitive to changes














29holds, then the equilibrium price can actually be q∗ = q∗
1. Furthermore, the market clears since q∗
1 < (μI +
μS)/(1 + i), which ensures that z∗
SEU =¯ z>0. This is a limited participation equilibrium.




In this case, both types of agents are willing to participate; as we know from (9) z∗
AA > 0, while z∗
SEU ≥ 0i f
q ≤ (μI + μS)/(1 + i), and z∗
SEU < 0 otherwise. By the market clearing condition
¯ z = α
























































I +( 1− α)σ2
max
¤.
In fact, by construction, this can be an equilibrium price only if (μmin + μS)/(1 + i) >q ∗
2,t h a ti s ,i f
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Dividing both sides of this inequality by (1 + i)(σ2
S + σ2
max) ,w eg e tt h a t( μmin + μS)/(1 + i) >q ∗
2 only if









(11) ensures that q∗
2 may eﬀectively be an equilibrium price in which z∗
AA > 0. Furthermore, the sign of z∗
SEU
depends on whether q∗
2 ≤ (μI + μS)/(1 + i) or not. This is a participation equilibrium.





In this case z∗
AA < 0, but then, as noted above, z∗










SEU are negative, the stock market cannot clear. So, there is no equilibrium for which
q>(μmax + μS)/(1 + i). We summarize these results in the following:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Stock Price). If the condition














































































I +( 1− α)σ2
max
¤. (15)
The equilibrium is unique.
The intuition of the result is that when the minimum possible mean payoﬀ perceived by the AA investors
is so low to fall below the threshold given by (12)–i.e., the real value of the mean idiosyncratic payoﬀ
corrected by a factor that increases in total variance, the supply volume, and the fraction of market that is
made up by AA investors and declines with the inﬂation rate–then only SEU investors will participate. The
simple explanation is that the low expected stock payoﬀsa r ei n s u ﬃcient to provide adequate compensation
to AA investor. In this case, the pricing functional in (13) depends on objective (or, unique prior subjective)
parameters, as they are (correctly) perceived by the SEU-maximizers. Interestingly, among the parameters
that aﬀect the SEU-only price, q∗
1,w ea l s oﬁnd α, the proportion of AA investors. Therefore, even when
the AA agents are not trading the stock, their mere existence will aﬀect the equilibrium stock price. On
the contrary, if the minimum possible mean payoﬀ perceived by the AA traders is high enough to clear the
same threshold, then both types of investors participate and the price has the considerably more complicated
structure in (15). In this case, both the single-prior (μI, μS, σ2
I, σ2
S) and the multiple-prior (μmin , σ2
max)
parameters enter the expression for q∗
2.
Additionally, notice that while (13) has the typical mean-variance, Gaussian CARA structure in which the
stock price increases with the mean expected payoﬀs and with the SEU-maximizer fraction, while it declines
with variance and the supply volume, (15) has a complicated functional form because it allows mean payoﬀ
parameters to interact with the “variance parameters”, in particular both σ2
I and σ2
max.23 Also notice that
when the switch from (15) to (13) occurs, in correspondence to









23The sign of the derivative of q
∗







































































































































which means that when transitioning from mixed SEU and AA joint participation to SEU-only equilibria,
the price must undergo a positive jump from q∗
2 to q∗
1. This is consistent with the fact that when the
equilibrium outcome is based on attracting positive demand from AA investors, the price must decline enough
to compensate them for absorbing ambiguity, given their ambiguity aversion.
5.4. Risk premia under ambiguity
Because in our partial equilibrium set up, we have taken the real riskless interest rate as given and assumed
that inﬂation is determined by policy-makers, we may as well set rf = 0 so that the notions of expected real
risky return and of real risk premium coincide. Therefore the risk premium is
E(·)[1 + ˜ R]=
E[d]
(1 + i)q∗,
where ˜ R denotes the net return on the risky asset. At this point, there are two notions of risk premium
that can be entertained. One is an objective notion and corresponds to an aggregate, market viewpoint that
considers both the true expectations of the risky payoﬀs at time 1 and the current equilibrium market price.











− μI − μS
&
> 0,
which also depends on the inﬂation rate itself. Needless to say, the sign of the partial derivative of q
∗
2 with respect to i is even
more complicated to study, but in general whether or not stocks provide a good inﬂation hedge will depend on the exogeneous
parameters in rather complicated ways.
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32This is also the risk premium expected by an external observer that understands the structure of the model
and solves for the equilibrium, as we have done.25 Naturally, this is the notion of risk premium relevant
to an econometrician interested in understanding the nature of the returns data produced by the market.
The other is a subjective notion and corresponds to the expectation–obviously diﬀerent across SEU and
AA investors–of the premium that each individual investor will form before (or without) understanding the
overall structure of the model and the outcomes generated by the interaction of SEU and AA investors.
Starting with the ﬁrst, objective notion (that we and denote by setting (·)t o∗), in correspondence to
Proposition 1 we have:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Risk Premia). When (12) holds and only SEU investors participate in the







(1 − α)(1+i)(μI + μS)













(μI + μS)(1 + i)A
(1 + i)[αμminB +( 1− α)μIC + μSA] − ¯ zBC
, (17)
where A ≡ ασ2




S, and C ≡ σ2
max + σ2
S.
The proof consists of simple algebraic manipulations given the deﬁnition of risk premium and are omitted.
The two expressions make intuitive sense. E∗






, with the total supply to be absorbed ¯ z (because in equilibrium, a larger proportion of the overall
investors’ wealth will have to be exposed to the risk represented by σ2
I + σ2
S), and with the proportion α of
AA agents, since given the total supply a smaller fraction of SEU-only investors will have to absorb the entire
supply and hence will demand a higher premium to compensate the diminished diversiﬁcation available to
them; E∗
1[1 + ˜ R] declines with (μI + μS) and with the inﬂation rate. This last result indicates that in the
segmented, SEU-only equilibrium the risky asset must necessarily provide a less-than-perfect hedge, since as
the inﬂation rate rises, the real equilibrium risk premium will decline.26
Similar results hold with reference to E∗
2[1+ ˜ R]. The intuition (as well as the formal proof) is easily obtained
from the expression for the demand of AA and SEU investors in Section 5.2 when there is participation from
both groups. First, the algebraic expression for E∗
2[1 + ˜ R] shows that as one would anticipate, an increasing
exogenous supply of the security will increase the risk premium while an increase in the inﬂation rate will
decrease the risk premium. Finally, when α increases, because σ2
I ≤ σ2
max and μmin <μ I,t h en u m e r a t o ro f
25As stressed by Easley and O’Hara (2007) in a related application, if an outsider were to ignore parts of the model–in
particular, the level of μmin and σ
2
max–and observe prices and returns produced by a model in which AA traders aﬀect prices,
she will incorrectly conclude that the ﬁnancial market is irrational because the securities are be priced incorrectly, with prices too




S). Notice that Proposition 1
has shown that AA traders aﬀect equilibrium prices also in the SEU-only equilibrium in which they actually fail to trade.
26Interestingly, while it is impossible to sign the dependence of the price q
∗
1 on the inﬂation rate, this becomes possible for the
associated risk premium. This means that between the direct eﬀect of i on the equilibrium price and the indirect eﬀect on the
possibility to satisfy the non-participation condition in (12), the ﬁrst eﬀect always more than the compensates the latter.
33the expression for q∗
2, (15) decreases; viceversa its denominator increases. Therefore, on the whole q∗
2 declines
so that the risk premium increases: the higher is the percentage of investors who are AA, the higher is the
risk premium on the security.
(16) and (17) are derived assuming knowledge of the objective market outcome and–by the law of large
numbers–correspond to the average, realized real excess returns on the risky asset if a long sequence of
systematic and idiosyncratic shocks were to be drawn. However, these are diﬀerent from the risk premia
which are perceived by both categories of investors. The SEU investors perceive an ex-ante risk premium
of ESEU[1 + ˜ R]=E∗
1[1 + ˜ R]. This means that every time a participation equilibrium outcome obtains (i.e.,
(14) holds), the SEU-maximizers will be surprized by the level of the average realized real excess returns.
In particular, SEU agents will systematically ﬁnd that the realized real excess returns are “too high” in the
light of the underlying economic environment as they perceive it. Of course, this is due to the existence of
an additional source of uncertainty–ambiguity, indeed–that is priced in equilibrium and of which the SEU
investors are not aware, while AA investor are.
The ambiguity averse investors perceive instead a risk premium of:27
EAA[1 + ˜ R]=
(1 − α)(1+i)(μmin + μS)






It can be shown that EAA[1 + ˜ R] >E ∗
2[1 + ˜ R] >E ∗
1[1 + ˜ R]=ESEU[1 + ˜ R], i . e . ,A Aa g e n t sa l w a y sd e m a n d
a risk premium which is higher than what SEU agents’ expect to receive. This makes sense, since they also
need to be compensated for bearing ambiguity. Therefore AA investors are always negatively surprised by the
realized real excess returns, even when the investors themselves participate in the market. This is consistent
with the earlier ﬁnding that if σI ≤ σmax, the position in the risky asset held by ambiguity averse agents is
always smaller (in absolute value) than the one held by SEU agents. Mechanically, this is due to the fact
that AA participate only when also SEU agents do, and the resulting price will be (loosely speaking) some





5.5.1. Aﬀecting the diﬀusion of ambiguity-averse behaviors (α)
The ﬁrst type of policy a central planner may pursue is to try and aﬀect the proportions of AA- and SEU-
maximizers which compose the economy, α and 1 − α. Our results make it clear that the eﬀect of a policy
that tends to change (decrease) α will depend on the initial conﬁguration as represented by the equilibrium
price function and the level of participation. Suppose that initially both groups of investors participate in the
27The following assumes that ambiguity-averse investors are expressing a positive net demand for the risky asset and are
therefore demanding a risk premium in order to hold it. As we have seen, in equilibrium this is the only feasible outcome.
28Because SEU investors believe that the risky asset is under-priced, and thus that it oﬀers abnormally high excess returns and
ambiguity-averse traders believe that the asset is over-priced, and thus that it oﬀers abnormally low excess returns in equilibrium
both types of traders will hold portfolios which diﬀer from the market portfolio in their attempt to take advantage of the perceived
mispricing.
34market, so that the equilibrium price is q∗ = q∗
2.T h ep o l i c ym a k e rﬁnds a way to instantaneously decrease the
fraction of ambiguity averse agents, α.S i n c eσ2
I ≤ σ2
max and μmin <μ I, the numerator of the expression for
q∗
2, (15), increases; viceversa its denominator declines. Therefore, on the whole q∗
2 increases. However, as this
happens it is possible for the condition (μmin +μS)/(1 + i) >q ∗
2 to start being violated and q∗
2 may enter the
region ((μmin + μS)/(1 + i), (μmax + μS)/(1 + i)); when this occurs, participation from the AA investors will
cease and the pricing function will switch to (13); as we have noticed in Section 5.2, this implies an upward
price jump. Therefore, an attempt to decrease α and simply increase the proportion of SEU-maximizers
represents a policy approach with mixed outcomes. On the one hand, it is certain that such an intervention
will increase equilibrium prices; on the other hand, it may end up penalizing the overall participation to the
market and reduce liquidity and trading volume.29 The intuition is that if very few AA agents are left in the
market, the equilibrium price will mostly reﬂect the fundamental risk assessments expressed by SEU investor,
and the resulting price will end being “too high” for AA investors to participate. On the contrary, if the
policy maker were to try and increase α, then (again, because σ2
I ≤ σ2
max and μmin <μ I)t h en u m e r a t o ro f
the expression for q∗
2, (15) decreases; viceversa its denominator increases. Therefore, q∗
2 declines so that the
condition (μmin +μS)/(1+i) >q ∗
2 continues to hold. This means that if both types of investors were trading
before the policy intervention, then, after the increase in α, both types will be still both trading the stock.
At the same time, this intervention will raise the real risk premium, since for AA agents to participate, more
attractive conditions must be oﬀered.30
Suppose instead that initially only SEU investors were present in the market. If α is reduced, the price
increases and that makes the stock even less attractive to the AA investors who would be left in the economy.
As a result the limited participation equilibrium would not be aﬀected and the risk premium would decline.
However, if a policy-maker tries and increases α, from the expression for q∗
1, it is clear that this will lead to
a decrease in the equilibrium price (and this in spite of the fact that AA agents are actually not trading).
So if α increases enough, the equilibrium price will fall below the threshold (μmin +μS)/(1 + i), so that both
groups will be then be willing to trade in the stock market, which will actually increase the stock price. In
fact, one may compute a threshold ¯ α such that when α is raised suﬃciently, then the equilibrium switches
from limited participation by SEU-maximizers only to both agent types. Such an ¯ α solves:







(1 − ¯ α)(1+i)
29Notice that there is no contradiction in the latter claim: starting from a situation in which 100% of the potential investors
(including the AA fraction α0) participate to the market trading stocks, by suﬃciently decreasing α (say, to α0 −∆α)t h ep o l i c y -
maker may induce a switch to an equilibrium in which only 1 − α0 + ∆α<1 of the potential investors participate. Unless
∆α = −α0, this implies a loss in participation.
















which is a special case of the standard Gaussian-CARA asset demand function, where μmin and σ
2













Clearly, in the process the risk premium at ﬁrst increases and then, after the switch, it declines. This means
that starting from α<¯ α,w h e nα is increased at ﬁrst, the price will decline, the risk premium increase, and
declining participation (as only the fraction 1 − α of investors participates) will be caused; only when α is
increased to the point that it reaches ¯ α, the price will decline even further (from q∗
1(α)d o w nt oq∗
2(¯ α)) but a
new participating equilibrium will be established.
These results reveal a clear asymmetry in the ability to use policy to aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. While
increasing α is always possible and it implies that while equilibrium prices decline, more participation may be
ultimately attained, decreasing α has non-linear eﬀects: a threshold exists, such that if α declines and therefore
the equilibrium price increases enough, then the market may switch to an SEU-only participation regime and
this may cause a sudden drop in trading and liquidity. This imposes severe limitations to the possibility of
implementing policies through α, unless the goal of α = 0 is attainable. At α = 0 the AA investors disappear
altogether, there is full participation, and the expression for demand and equilibrium price are the standard







5.5.2. Changing the “amount” of ambiguity-relevant uncertainty (μmin and σ2
max)
Another type of policy available to a policy maker consists in convincing AA investors that certain sensitive
scenarios–as deﬁned by the distributions {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P} and {σ2
1,σ2
2,...,σ2
Q}–can be safely ruled out. Propo-
sition 1 reveals that the sensitive scenarios are those deﬁned by μmin and σ2
max.C o n s i d e rﬁrst an attempt to
increase μmin, i.e., to “chop oﬀ” the worst possible outcomes from {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P}.31 The intuition is that
the policy maker tries and persuades the α-proportion of AA agents that some particularly ghastly beliefs on
future idiosyncratic shocks are impossible. For instance, the policy maker may try to convey to the market
the idea that μmin = −μS < 0 (which can be interpreted as bankruptcy) can be disregarded. Once more,
we have to distinguish between the two cases implied by Proposition 1. Suppose that only SEU agents are
initially trading in the market, so that (12) holds while the price is given by (13). Clearly, small variations
in the worst perceived, possible mean stock payoﬀ μmin have per se no immediate eﬀect on the equilibrium
price. Nevertheless, if μmin increases enough, ambiguity AA will decide to participate, when the condition
(14) starts being satisﬁed. This happens when μmin exceeds









In that case, we know that the equilibrium price will jump down from q∗
1 to q∗
2 and the risk premium increase.
The implication is that starting from situations of SEU-only participation, it will take large jumps in ¯ μmin for
the equilibrium to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected; however, when this happens, one can also expect a detrimental
eﬀect on risky asset prices. Interestingly and realistically, as the fraction of AA investors α increases, the
31No sensible policy maker will ever try and reduce μmin, thus increasing the amount of ambiguity in the market and leading
to reduced participation and lower prices.
36threshold level ¯ μmin required for inducing participation reduces, since now each AA agent has to bear a lower
amount of risk. This is relatively surprising: even though the policy action consists of ruling out the worst
possible scenarios increasing μmin, for an action of suﬃcient magnitude its eventual eﬀect on equilibrium prices
will be negative and the cost of enforcing a participation equilibrium will consist of a higher risk premium.
This means that when a market has fallen into a state of disruption (a SEU-only equilibrium), bringing
the market back to higher liquidity and orderly functioning through a reduction in the amount of perceived
ambiguity may actually go through further reductions in equilibrium prices.
Suppose instead that the market is one in which initially there is full participation by all investor types.
In this case, we know that the pricing function is (15), which implies that q∗
2 will increase continuously as
μmin is increased (this is due to the fact that z∗
AA increases given z∗
SEU), while it is clear that increasing μmin
has no eﬀect on the participation constraint, which will still be satisﬁed. In fact, it can be shown algebraically










I +( 1− α)σ2
max
< 1,
the increase in the equilibrium price cannot prevent the participation of AA agents. Therefore in the presence
of full participation, reducing the amount of ambiguity has only positive eﬀects on prices and will reduce risk
premia. It seems then that they key objective of any policy maker ought to prevent equilibria with limited
participation to appear in the ﬁrst instance.
Another policy action with interesting implications uses the lever of a reduction in σ2
max, i.e., the highest
possible level of uncertainty in the idiosyncratic component of the shocks perceived by AA investors.32 The
intuition is that the policy maker tries and persuades the α-proportion of AA agents that some particularly
appalling beliefs on the variance of future stock idiosyncratic shocks are not possible, thus eﬀectively “chopping







. If initially only SEU agents were participating, then a
variation in σ2
max has no eﬀect on the market. This because both the pricing function (13) and the participation
condition (14) do not depend on σ2
max.D i ﬀerently from the case of the mean idiosyncratic payoﬀ parameter
μmin, when AA investors are sitting on the sidelines, their maximum perceived uncertainty on idiosyncratic
shocks is irrelevant. On the other hand, if initially both groups of investors were participating, then if σ2
max
declines, the demand from the AA investors, z∗
AA, will increase, as shown by (9). From the market clearing
condition (¯ z = αz∗
AA +( 1− α)z∗
SEU)w ek n o wt h a tz∗
SEU has to decline; however, to induce SEU agents
to reduce their demand for the asset, the market price q∗
2 has to increase. Additionally, participation is not
aﬀected. This is a very interesting result. First, reducing σ2
max is completely ineﬀective if the market is already
segmented to include SEU investors only. This means that if a policy maker lets the situation deteriorate
enough, to the point that all AA agents leave the market, then changing their perceived uncertainty concerning
idiosyncratic shocks becomes irrelevant. As we have seen, when a market has already broken down in terms
of participation, trying to aﬀect the perceived uncertainty by increasing μmin may actually depress prices and
inﬂate risk premia, although this policy can eventually raise liquidity and induce full participation. Second,
32No sensible policy maker will ever try and increase σ
2
max, because this would simply lead to lower market prices.
37when the action is taken while segmentation has not yet occurred, its eﬀect is not to change the participation
incentives, but to simply provide support for equilibrium prices. In this sense, policies that rely on interventions
on the perceived uncertainty of future idiosyncratic shocks only have price eﬀects but no liquidity eﬀects.
It is possible to check that these eﬀects are magniﬁed if it is assumed that the single-prior of the SEU,



































j=1 are some subjective priors (common to all SEU agents) over alternative levels
of mean and variance of the risky asset ﬁnal payoﬀ.33 Clearly, “chopping oﬀ” μmin and/or σ2
max from the








































This creates a natural link between the multiple priors of AA investors and the single, unique prior of the
SEU agents. At this point, an increase in μmin causes an increase in μI (to ˜ μI). In this case, there is an eﬀect
even in the case in which initially only SEU investors are trading in the market: the security price increases
while the risk premium declines, and this independently of whether the increase in μmin may be large enough
to lead AA agents to participate. If instead the market is one in which initially both SEU and AA investors
are trading, the market price will increase both because μmin increases and also because the same eﬀect is
exercised on μI. Therefore the eﬀects previously argued are simply magniﬁed. An identical conclusion applies
to the case in which the policy-maker reduces σ2
max: if initially only SEU agents were participating in the
economy, then the reduction in σ2
I (to ˜ σ2
I) will increase the demand from SEU investors and lead to an increase
in price and a decline in the risk premium. If initially both groups of investors were participating, then if σ2
max
declines, the demand from the AA investors, z∗
AA, will increase, and the same happens to z∗
SEU, because of
the eﬀect on σ2
I. Therefore results are the same but they are magniﬁed by the newly instituted link between
multiple and single, SEU-type priors.
33Notice that the single-prior parameters μI and σ
2
I always aﬀect the demands of SEU investors so that these values will be
reﬂected in equilibrium prices. We do not allow AA investors to make inferences about these values from prices. The level of
sophistication that this would require of our AA traders seems inconsistent with their assumed naivity.
385.5.3. Inﬂation (i)
One last lever in the hands of the policy maker is the inﬂation rate, i. Suppose that i is increased in an














(the derivative of q∗
1 with respect to i) has an ambiguous sign that depends on all the parameters, the
equilibrium market price q∗
1 changes non-monotonically with i. In fact, when the initial inﬂation rate is
suﬃciently high, simulations reveal that (18) is likely to be negative so that the risky asset price declines
when inﬂation increases; however, for i ' 0–which is rather realistic in a deep recession caused by a ﬁnancial
crisis–one cannot establish any sign restrictions, because the outcome depends on the relative magnitude of






. However, it is clear that if initially the non-participation constraint (12)
held, an increase in i cannot perturb the inequality. Therefore a higher inﬂation rate in a segmented market
in which all AA investors have left already, simply strengthens the segmentation, while produces ambiguous
eﬀects on risky asset prices (negative provided there is enough subjectively perceived total variance, σ2
I +σ2
S).
Therefore, inﬂation as a policy tool seems either ineﬀective or perverse because it cannot relax participation
constraints while it may depress real equilibrium prices.
In the same situation, consider now a reduction of the inﬂation rate. The eﬀect on equilibrium asset prices
remains ambiguous, although an increase in asset prices is the most likely outcome if the initial inﬂation rate is
not close to zero. On the other hand, if the reduction in the inﬂation rate is substantive enough, there is now a















(1 − α)(μI − μmin)
− 1
and the participation constraint (14) is now satisﬁed. If this happens, we know that a reduction in the inﬂation
rate will bring increased participation, possibly higher liquidity, but lower asset prices.
Suppose that i is increased in an environment in which both SEU and AA investors participate already.
If one diﬀerentiates the expression for (15) with respect to i, a reasoning similar to the one applied to the
SEU-only market leads to conclude that the equilibrium market price q∗
2 may change non-monotonically
when i is increased. In fact, when the initial inﬂation rate is high, then the reaction of the real risky
asset price is likely to be negative so that the real price declines when inﬂation increases and hedging is
imperfect; however, for i ' 0 one cannot establish any sign restrictions, because the outcome depends on the


































I +( 1− α)σ2
max
¤
. However, it is clear that if initially (14) held, it
may stop being satisﬁed. Therefore a higher inﬂation rate in a non-segmented market produces ambiguous
eﬀects on risky asset prices (negative provided there is enough subjectively perceived total variance, σ2
I + σ2
S
and/or the perceived maximum idiosyncratic variance by AA investors, σ2
max,i ss u ﬃciently high) and even
39threatens to disrupt markets by forcing segmentation upon them. Intuitively, this happens when inﬂation
becomes so high that–given subjective risk and a perception of additional uncertainty as represented by
σ2
max–the real expected payoﬀs from the risky asset become insuﬃcient to compete with the real, riskless
rate of return guaranteed to AA investors by the money market account. Once more, inﬂation as a policy
tool seems either ineﬀective or perverse because it may induce limited participation and depress equilibrium
real asset prices.
In the same situation, consider now a reduction of the inﬂation rate. The eﬀect on equilibrium asset prices
remains ambiguous, although an increase in asset prices remains the likely outcome if the initial inﬂation
rate is not close to zero. On the other hand, there is no a chance that the participation constraint (14)
may stop being satisﬁed: if both SEU and AA agents were initially trading in the market, this remains the
case in a regime with lower inﬂation. Therefore low inﬂation has only virtues, leading to steady, widespread
participation, steady liquidity, and (with high probability) even to higher risky asset prices in real terms.
Therefore, it seems that a sensible policy-maker interested in supporting a well-functioning, non-segmented
asset market ought to reduce inﬂation.
5.6. Generalizations
We ask now to what degree our conclusion that AA may lead to a market break-downs depends on the
fact that so far the AA investors have “suﬀered” from ambiguity only with reference to idiosyncratic risk.
Also in the case of this parametric model, it is possible to show that a suﬃcient condition for ambiguity
to induce market break-downs is that the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of the
idiosyncratic risk component is larger than the spread between the highest and the lowest possible return of
the systematic component. In general, the algebra and the related suﬃcient conditions are rather involved. In
the interest of intuition and simplicity, we assume from now on that ¯ z = 0, i.e., that the risky asset is again of a
derivative type in endogenous zero net supply. Assume that AA investors do not know the exact value for the
parameters μS and σ2
S but–similarly to what happens to the idiosyncratic payoﬀ components–they perceive




loss of generality, let w0
m = 0. As always, there shall be trade in the risky asset only if there is one agent
who is willing to buy the asset, and another agent who is willing to sell it. As before, the end-of-period-one





+ bm(1 + rf).
where zm can be positive or negative, depending on whether agent m is buying or selling the asset. The





















subject to an obvious budget constraint. Initially, let’s consider the case in which ambiguity-aversion only
concerns the systematic component of payoﬀs. This means that–rather oddly, one has to admit–investors





. Therefore they maximize an













necessary and suﬃcient condition for optimality yields an optimal risky investment identical to (7) from which
the same analysis on the sign z∗
m and its dependence on the relationship between the price of the asset and
its expected payoﬀ in (8) can be performed. Without loss of generality, assume now μS,min = μS,1 ≤ μS,2 ≤
... ≤ μS,P 0 = μS,max. For any prior (μS,σ 2
S) ∈
©





S,Q0} the agents can














Hence there is one agent who is willing to buy the asset only if q<(μI + μS,max)/(1 + i). Viceversa, there is
one agent who is willing to sell the asset only if q>(μI +μS,min)/(1+i). Therefore there will be trade in the
risky asset (that is, z∗
m 6=0 ,m =1 ,2) only if
μI + μS,min <μ I + μS,max,
which is clearly satisﬁed. Therefore, if the ambiguity concerns only the systematic risk component, then there
will be always trade. This creates the suspicion that when ambiguity aversion aﬀects both systematic and
idiosyncratic risk, for trading to fail there must be “more ambiguity” on the idiosyncratic component than on
the systematic one.
As a next step, we re-introduce ambiguity aversion in the idiosyncratic component. As before, AA investors
only know that the mean μI of the distribution belongs to the set {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P}, and the variance σ2



















it is easy to check that:















































μI min =m i n {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P}
μI max =m a x {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P}
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41F o ra n yp r i o r( μS,σ 2
S) ∈
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S,Q0} the agents may have formed, the following














Hence there is one agent who is willing to buy the asset only if q<(μI,min+μS,max)/(1+i). Viceversa, there is
one agent who is willing to sell the asset only if q>(μI max+μS min)/(1+i). As a result, there can be trade (that
is, z∗









. In conclusion, suﬃcient condition for trade to fail is that the spread
between the highest and the lowest possible return of the idiosyncratic component is larger than the spread
between the highest and the lowest possible return of the systematic component. This conﬁrms that market
breakdowns due to AA may occur if and only if the ambiguity concerns the idiosyncratic risk components and
if this ambiguity exceeds the ambiguity on the systematic components.
5.7. Can policy making improve welfare?
Up to this point, we have simply adopted a heuristic approach to policy interventions in the presence of
ambiguity. This meant that we have evaluated as “useful” the policies able to induce participation, with the
constraint that in general they should not achieve this goal through a reduction in equilibrium prices. In this
Section we go beyond this simplistic approach and show that–even when the utility indices of both groups
of investors are formally considered and the fact that resources may be distributed by a central planner only
after introducing taxes or other forms of redistributions is kept into account–welfare improving policies that
exploit the possibility of increasing μmin and reducing σ2
max may exist.
Consider the following policy aimed at inducing AA investors to trade: the policy maker guarantees a
subsidy in the measure sc > 0 based on the occurrence of the events in the partition {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P} perceived
by the AA investor. In particular, if the event that ﬁnds realization is such that the corresponding mean μc
is below or equal to some threshold (i.e., if the actual state of the world is suﬃciently “bad”),

























Otherwise, i.e., for suﬃciently good states, no subsidy is paid. For concreteness, let’s suppose that the
policy maker sets μc = μmin. In practice, this implies that the policy consists of increasing μmin up to
















42Since the policy eﬀectively “chops oﬀ” a portion of {μ1,μ 2,...,μ P} thus reducing the uncertainty eﬀectively
perceived by AA agents, it is sensible to also assume that AA agents also perceive the policy as a reduction
of the maximal possible variance to ˜ σ2
max = σ2
max − ∆ for some 0 < ∆ <σ 2
max. T h i si sr e a l i s t i cb e c a u s e
compensating AA for the worst possible scenarios must also reduce to some extent their perceived uncertainty
on the variance of the idiosyncratic payoﬀ they are facing. SEU agents are not aﬀected by the policy because
they do not believe that a state characterized by μmin will ever occur. To support the policy, the central
authority introduces a tax rate τ ∈ (0,1) on the systematic payoﬀ. Notice that the tax must be collected at
time 0 and as such it hits the expected stock payoﬀs, not their realization. As a result of the policy notice
that μmin is replaced by ˜ μmin = μmin + smin,σ 2
max by ˜ σ2
max = σ2
max − ∆, and μS by ˜ μS = μS(1 − τ). On the
contrary, μI,σ 2
I, and σ2
S are left unchanged, although we have to notice that the total variance perceived by






Finally, deﬁne ξ ≡ σ2
S + ασ2
I +( 1− α)σ2
max and notice that after the policy is enacted, ξ switches to
˜ ξ ≡ ˜ σ2
S + α˜ σ2










− (1 − α)∆
¤
= ξ − (1 − α)∆ <ξ .
Finally, call the weighted sum–with weights α and 1−α, respectively–of the utility indices of both types of
agents before the policy is implemented WNP(σ2
I,σ2
max,σ2
S,μ I,μ S,μ min,i)( w h e r eW means “welfare”) and the
sum of the utility indices under the policy WP(˜ σ2
I, ˜ σ2
max, ˜ σ2
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Then the following result obtains:
Proposition 3 (Welfare gains). Assume μS >μ I and that, for the given α, the following condition holds:




S, ˜ μI, ˜ μS, ˜ μmin,i) >W NP(σ2
I,σ2
max,σ2
S,μ I,μ S,μ min,i), w h i c hm e a n st h a tap o l i c yi n t e r -
vention that changes ˜ μmin and σ2
max in the ways illustrated before will improve overall welfare.
The condition–which can be re-written as α/(1−α) <μ S/μI–can be interpreted as saying that either α
(the “weight” of AA investors) is small relative to the proportion of SEU investors or that the mean impact
of idiosyncratic payoﬀ risk is small compared to the mean impact of systematic risk. One way or the other,
43this condition implies that either ambiguity has a moderate role in composition terms or in payoﬀ structure
terms. This would suﬃcient for a central planner to devise a simple “state-contingent” lump-sum subsidy
scheme that increases welfare, in the deﬁnition given above. Appendix B proves this proposition.
Notice that the policy examined in this Section is potentially a tail-event one, i.e., one that can be
announced but has very small chances to be actually implemented, in the sense that setting μc = μmin corre-
sponds to the intuition that the public subsidy smin is paid out only in correspondence of truly catastrophic
event, similarly to public insurance provided to cover against large natural catastrophes. This is the same
phenomenon noticed in a diﬀerent application by Easley and O’Hara (2005): simply changing the perception
of extreme models/events can potentially have large eﬀects on equilibrium outcomes. These eﬀects arise be-
cause AA individuals attach great importance to worst case scenarios, with the result that they can choose
not to participate in the market. The eﬀects are large relative to those that could be expected in an economy
with only SEU traders. In such an economy the eﬀect of extreme scenarios on asset prices is multiplied by the
prior on the model which would most naturally be small. With AA investors the eﬀect of extreme scenarios
is direct–it is not multiplied by any prior belief.
5.8. Discussion: recent policy strategies
It is tempting to use the implications of our simple model to make sense and evaluate the policies that have
been recently enacted to deal with the ﬁnancial crisis. In doing so, we have to keep in mind at least two
caveats. First, the model in this Section is obviously too rudimentary to provide an exhaustive framework
within which to assess the eﬀectiveness of any policy. Second, our discussion will mostly focus on policy
strategies enacted in the U.S. Even though many countries/areas seem to have quite explicitly followed the
steps undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury in dealing with ﬁnancial turbulence, clearly
2008 has witnessed a range of heterogeneous policy reactions throughout the world, from which we will largely
abstract here.
Policy-makers have reacted to the spiralling crises in three ways. First, they have quickly switched to
an extremely accommodative monetary policy stance, with fast-paced reductions in key policy target rates
between 400 and 500 b.p. between the Summer of 2007 and the end of 2008. Even though these eﬀorts are
also (one may argue, mostly) directed at contrasting the global recession that has swept through developed
and emerging market economies since early 2008, one can also interpret–this certainly has been the case
in the U.S. in the ﬁrst part of the crisis, up to the Summer of 2008–these actions as attempts to simply
reduce the spread of AA behaviors (i.e., α) in the economy: by ﬁghting oﬀ the impending recession and
clearly communicating goals and tools, policy makers may create an environment in which any residual,
diﬃcult-to-quantify uncertainty is easier to disregard and in which it may be rational to behave as typical
SEU investors would. Notice that in this interpretation, clear communication of feasible goals and eﬀective
tools is as important as the actual strategies that aim at stimulating production, employment and therefore
ﬁnancial solvency. A related point concerns the quantitative easing strategies announced and/or implemented
44in the U.S. and the U.K. in late 2008 and while this paper is being written. Although an intense debate is
raging as to whether such balance-sheet credit policies may increase the risk of higher-than-desirable inﬂation
in the medium-long run, we have argued earlier on that letting the inﬂation rate i surge generally represents
ap o o rt o o lt oﬁght market breakdowns and the high risk spreads that often accompany them.34
Second, it may argued that policy makers have explicitly and implicitly dealt with ﬁnancial turmoil and
impaired market functioning in the most direct way, i.e., by “jump-starting” a number of credit markets
by direct intervention. For instance, already in August 2007, the Federal Reserve announced changes in
discount window policies to facilitate the orderly functioning of short-term credit markets.35 In December
2007, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF), through which predetermined amounts
of discount window credit are auctioned every two weeks. The TAF appears to have overcome the reluctance
to borrow associated with standard discount window lending because of its competitive auction format, the
certainty that a large amount of credit would be made available, and the fact that it is not designed to only
meet urgent needs, thus avoiding stigma eﬀects. To address the increasing demand for dollar funding in
foreign jurisdictions, in December 2007 the Federal Reserve has arranged a number of reciprocal currency
arrangements (swap lines) with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB);
similar arrangements exist with the Bank of England. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced a
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) facility designed to increase credit availability at normal
interest rate spreads. Under its current design, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York lends to holders
of certain Aaa-rated asset-backed securities, such as commercial MBS and private-label residential MBS.36
These policies all imply that policy-makers directly intervene in the collapsed markets by either playing a
market-making role, or by providing liquidity to other market investors. Clearly, these are strategies that
fail to match with any precise feature of the model and that are sensible only ex-post, when markets have
collapsed already and dealing with limited participation requires strong measures.
34Notice that monetary policy cannot represent a tool through which μmin and/or σ
2
max m a yb ed i r e c t l ya ﬀected because general
policies inﬂuence by construction systematic, not idiosynchratic factors. As we have seen, at least in our simple model, it is only
the latter type of risk that matters for optimal decisions under AA. In practice, it is even possible that if the “size” of systematic
risks is reduced too much, to become inferior to the “size” of idiosynchratic risks, AA may cause limited participation and market
disruptions.
35The spread of the primary credit rate over the target federal funds rate was narrowed from 100 basis points to 50 basis points
in August 2007 and to 25 basis points in March 2008. The maximum loan term was extended to 30 days in August 2007 and to
90 days in March 2008. Institutions have been given the option to renew term loans so long as they remain in sound ﬁnancial
condition.
36Other, related programs are Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), introduced in March 2008 to lend Treasury securities at
auction against the collateral of high-grade securities (including Aaa-rated MBS and other asset-backed securities) held by market
dealers. The Bank of England has also established a facility to swap government bonds for banks’ mortgage-backed securities
for a term of one to three years. The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF),
created in September 2008, extends loans at the primary credit rate to U.S. depository institutions to ﬁnance their purchases
of high-quality asset backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds. This initiative was intended to assist money
funds in meeting demands for redemptions by investors and to foster liquidity. The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF),
created in October 2008, provides a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper. The Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF), also created in October 2008, provides senior secured funding to a series of special purpose vehicles to facilitate
an industry-supported private-sector initiative to ﬁnance the purchase of certiﬁcates of deposit and commercial paper issued by
highly rated ﬁnancial institutions.
45Finally, a handful of recent policy measures–in fact, the most hotly debated for their political and ﬁscal
implications–may also be interpreted as attempts at lowering μmin and/or σ2
max, i.e., to reduce the “amount”
of ambiguity. In the Spring of 2008 the U.S. Treasury announced a temporary guarantee of the share prices of
money market mutual funds and, beginning in October 2008, it used authority granted under the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act to purchase preferred shares in a large number of depository institutions. Similar
policies have been enacted in Canada and in a number of European countries (see Section 2 for speciﬁc cases).
In particular, a handful of conglomerate ﬁnancial ﬁrms have been rescued in the U.S. and the U.K. For
instance, in mid-March of 2008, Bear Stearns was pushed to the brink of failure after ﬁnding itself without
access to short term ﬁnancing. The Federal Reserve judged that a disorderly failure of Bear Stearns would have
threatened overall ﬁnancial stability and as a result it provided special ﬁnancing to facilitate the acquisition
of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, which eventually took place in June 2008. In early September 2008,
the conditions of American International Group (AIG) deteriorated rapidly. In view of the likely systemic
implications and the potential for signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects of a disorderly failure of AIG, the Federal Reserve
lent $85 billion to the ﬁrm.37 In September 2008, to maintain the GSEs’ ability to purchase home mortgages,
the Treasury established a backstop lending facility to purchase up to $100 billion of preferred stock in Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, and to initiate a program to purchase agency MBS. Market anxiety about the condition
of Citigroup intensiﬁed in November 2008. To support ﬁnancial market stability, the U.S. government entered
into an agreement with Citigroup to provide a package of capital, guarantees, and liquidity access. As part
of the agreement, the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are providing capital
protection against outsized losses on a pool of about $306 billion in residential and commercial real estate
and other assets, Citigroup has issued preferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC, and the Treasury has
purchased an additional $20 billion in Citigroup preferred stock using TARP funds. A similar operation was
conducted to rescue Bank of America from intensifying pressures in January 2009.38 Besides the speciﬁcs
and the obvious goal of preventing a devastating ﬁnancial meltdown punctuated by multiple runs to ﬁnancial
institutions, all of these operations can also be interpreted as ways in which policy makers have cooperated
to persuade ﬁnancial markets that worst-case, catastrophic scenarios in the form of extremely low μmin values
or excessively large σ2
max values would be simply impossible because of the vigilant presence of the policy
authorities.
Even though we have seen that, generally speaking, shrinking the amount of ambiguity may lead to good
outcomes, it is a current topic of debate whether: (i) these policies have been reasonably eﬀective in supporting
asset prices and in bounding from above the credit risk spreads incorporated in market valuations (see Section
2 for details), and (ii) the policies have managed to prevent fully-ﬂedged market collapses (with very low or
zero participation by potential traders). In fact, as for (i), Section 5.3 and 5.4 have shown that reducing μmin
37In October 2008, the Federal Reserve announced an additional program under which it would lend up to $37.8 billion to
ﬁnance investment-grade, ﬁxed income securities held by AIG.
38The Bank of England and the British Treasury have been involved in a number of similar rescue operations (e.g., to the
beneﬁto fN o r t h e r nR o c k ,R o y a lB a n ko fS c o t l a n d ,a n dL loyds) throughout 2008. In some cases, fully-ﬂedged nationalization has
been used to tame market anxieties as to the solvency of the ﬁnancial institutions.
46may actually depress prices when the intervention takes place within an already nonparticipating equilibrium
(especially for high values of α). As for (ii) the empirical matter of assessing whether interventions have been
successful is currently clouded by the fact that a number of parallel policy programs have actually injected
massive amounts of liquidly in the collapsing (collapsed?) markets.
6. Conclusions
Our model has stressed that understanding ﬁnancial market behavior and equilibrium outcomes taking the
presence of ambiguity-aversion into account may deliver important insights, both to understand recent events
during the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial crisis and to improve the eﬀectiveness of policy actions. The main lesson
seems to be that–due to the powerful threshold eﬀects associated to market breakdowns–the key task for
policy makers may be in fact not to remedy to poor market liquidity and collapsing participation to return
markets to viable participation and liquidity standards, but in fact to avoid in the ﬁrst instance and at all
costs that a market breakdown may occur. Of course, this is almost (it is always true that the crises that are
easier to resolve are the ones that do not occur) trivial while–more importantly, in the light of the situation
in the world ﬁnancial market at the time this paper is being written–we may be too late. However, our
model does imply that many obvious policy tools–e.g., simply reducing the level of perceived ambiguity by
market participants–may often produce counter-intuitive eﬀects while under many parameter conﬁgurations
an unpalatable trade-oﬀ between risk premia and participation may emerge. Another interesting implications
is that higher inﬂation does not seem to be an appealing strategy to deal with distress in ﬁnancial markets.
In fact, even though its price eﬀects may be diﬃcult to track, if any, reducing the inﬂation rate may cause
more attractive eﬀects.
There are a number of directions in which our results could be extended. On the one hand, our investors
face a set of return distributions and those who are AA fail to aggregate these distributions to produce a
predicted return distribution. However, there are, at least, two other reasonable ways to view the decision
problem faced by our AA decision makers. First, they could be thought of as choosing robust portfolios. That
is they could search for portfolios that are robust to their uncertainty about the correct model for returns.
Hansen and Sargent (2000) follow this approach to evaluating macroeconomic models. Second, they could be
thought of as behavioral traders who either have biased beliefs or who do not maximize expected, or minimum
expected, utility (see Barberis and Thaler, 2000, for a review of the literature). It would be interesting to
examine the same or a similar model set up as the one in this paper and see whether our implications for
policy-making are robust to approaching the problem of modelling optimal portfolio decisions under these
alternative approaches.
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,a n du(w)=−exp(−w), then:




































































































































Plugging this into the previous expression for E [u(w)], we get:



































































After the adoption of the policy, AA agents are willing to invest in the risky asset only if









Since rfw0 appears in both WNP(σ2
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ate the eﬀect of the policy, it suﬃces to compare:
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50As for (i), recall that: ξ − (1 − α)∆ = σ2
S + σ2
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Therefore, inequality (i) holds. With reference to (ii), for any σ2
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can be rewritten as the sum between ˜ μS = μS(1 − τ) and a convex combination of μmin and μI with weights
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To verify (ii), we need to check that
(μI + μS)(1− α) >β(μmin + smin)+μS(1 − τ)+( 1− β)μI.
The right-hand side of the inequality is maximized at β = 0, hence consider (μI + μS)(1− α) >μ S(1−τ)+μI.
If there exists a τ ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes this condition, then it satisﬁes also the condition with β 6=0 .
In particular, notice that 0 < −μI
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Dynamics over Time of Origination and Market Value for U.S. Commercial Paper 
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All comm. paper AA financial comm. paper AA Asset-Backed comm. paper
 
        Source of the data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
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        Source of the data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors   53
Figure 2 
Dynamics of Risk Spreads in Money and Asset-Backed Markets 
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Weighted-Average Annualized Percentage Spreads for 
































































































































































AAA Mortgage-backed, fixed rate Mortgage-backed All, fixed rate
AAA Credit card-backed, fixed rate Credit card-backed All, fixed rate
`
 
        Source of the data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Bloomberg/Bear Sterns   54
Figure 3 
Dynamics of Risk Spreads in MBS and Commercial Paper Markets 
 
Panel A 
Annualized Weighted-Average Percentage Spreads for 
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`
 
        Source of the data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Bloomberg/Bear Sterns 
 
Panel B 


















































































































































































































































3-Month AA asset-backed comm. paper - 3M T-bill
3-Month A2/P2/F2 nonfinancial paper - 3M T-bill  
        Source of the data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
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Figure 4 
Total Index Returns for MBS and ABS 
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Corporate Bond Spreads 
 














































































































































































































































Aaa-Baa default spread Baa spread over 10Y Treasury
Aaa spread over 10Y Treasury  
        Source of the data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Moody’s 